Daily Report

East Europe

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Kosovo Resolution Credited to 'Albanian Diplomacy'

AU0301105496 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 20 Dec 95 p 1

[Commentary by S.N.: "Victory of Albanian Diplomacy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kosova is now, not only an Albanian problem, but a problem of the international community. This is no doubt a more realistic focus for the Albanian problem in the international arena. Four days ago, the UN General Assembly approved by a majority vote a resolution on the human rights situation in Kosova. This resolution was sponsored by the larger part of the permanent member states of the Security Council and also by a number of other countries of importance in solving international problems. The resolution was supported by 115 states, and this was the most unambiguous sign of support for Kosova. In contrast to other occasions, the international community's demand this time was not confined to the problem of violations of human rights, as basic rights stemming from the Human Rights Charter, but went further by putting the need for international supervision for the first time on the table. This means that Kosova has been elevated to a new level of international discussion and is being treated at a higher international level. The inclusion of the issue of Kosova on the international agenda as a problem requiring a full solution is a very great achievement of Albanian diplomacy. No such level of awareness could have been achieved without Albania's extraordinary work, and her insistence at every international forum and in the course of every reciprocal visit and important meeting held by the most senior figures of the Albanian state. It is worth emphasizing that President Berisha's meetings with President Clinton, Chancellor Kohl, and other diplomats in the role of negotiators for Balkan problems have been fruitful in leading to such a response as the resolution of the UN General Assembly. All these efforts by Albanian diplomacy have secured suitable terrain for Ibrahim Rugova, president of Kosova, to raise the issue of Kosova at levels worthy of the Albanian people living there. The coordination and frequency of the demands raised by the diplomacy of the Albanian state and the legitimate leadership of Kosova have led to the Albanian problem being raised, not as a transient or marginal issue, but an essential problem of preventing conflict in the Balkans. U.S. Secretary of State Christopher's statement that, after Dayton, Kosova is at the top of the international agenda is a further assurance that the steps of Albanian diplomacy in connection with this problem have not only been clear but are now bearing fruit. Albania has made world opinion unalterably aware that violence is being used in Kosova and that that this Albanian area is under occupation. Following the victory of democratic forces in Albania, parliament recognized the will of the Kosovar people to be independent and to determine their own destiny. All the work of the state and Albanian diplomacy in the service of the cause of Kosova has aimed at an optimal, peaceful solution that will be acceptable to the Albanian population living in Kosova. The most recent resolution is the fruit of what Albanian diplomacy has done toward solving this problem, and a sign of other specific actions it will undertake until the Albanian problem is entirely solved.

Defense Commission Calls for Budget Increase

AU0301105096 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 21 Dec 95 p 3

[Report by Ilir Alia: "Defense: 'We Ask for More Money'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—New pay increases for servicemen: This prediction made by the Defense Ministry itself is one of the items in the budget. Pay increases were mentioned at the meeting of the Commission for Defense, Public Order, and the National Intelligence Service that was held yesterday in order to discuss the new draft budget submitted by the government. The discussion concentrated mainly on the demand of ministry representatives to increase the Army's budget from 4.3 billion leks [L] to L10.6 billion. This would be a bare minimum for the Army, to cover pay, maintenance costs, and service pensions. Such a figure would be only 1.9 percent of GNP or 4.3 percent of the expenditure in the budget. Reaching the figure of L10.6 billion would mean that our country would no longer rank last in Europe for the size of its military budget. At the request of Azem Hajdari, the parliamentary commission's chairman, a special item was inserted about integrating the Army in NATO's structures and training an Albanian peacekeeping company.

Higher Spending Planned in 1996 Budget

AU0301104996 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 21 Dec 95 p 3

[Report by Ilir Alia: "Higher Pay in 1996"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—New pay increases in 1996: This promising news comes from the government itself. Pay increases planned in the draft presented by the parliamentary commission yesterday are thought to amount to a rise of 30 percent for public sector employees. There has also been a rise for pensioners, the largest being for those in rural areas. The increase in 1995 was 22 percent and was carried out in two

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stages in May and October. The education and health sectors were awarded 35 percent increases in these two stages. According to forecasts, revenue next year will amount to 62.350 billion leks [L], and expenditure to L99.627 billion, while the budget deficit for the year will be L16.6 million or 7.2 percent of GNP [figures as published]. Taxes next year, too, are expected to be the main source of revenue. Next year, it is forecast that about 64.4 percent of taxes will be collected, compared with 61 percent in 1995. The bill states that the volume of imports next year will be 7 percent higher than in 1995. The Construction and Tourism Ministry is forecast to take the largest slice of budget expenditure, to a tune of 54 percent compared with 51 percent in the current year. Road surfacing accounts for the larger part of these funds. The construction of new irrigation systems comes next, followed by investment in new apartments and sewers. Health is also a growing sector, with an expenditure of L700 million in 1996 compared to L559 million this year. Hospitals will account for L475 million. The budget plans for cuts in the Ministry of Mining and Energy, especially in the oil, chrome, and electrical energy sectors. These three sectors will now and in the future be covered by funds apart from the budget. There will be a significant increase in spending on education, from L763 million this year to L960 million in 1996. Eight-grade elementary schools will receive most, followed by high schools. Only culture and sport are faced with cuts, from L103 million this year to L90 million in 1996. Most of this will be devoted to culture. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare will also receive L3 million more next year.

Cabinet Approves Draft Budget

AU2612141595 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 23 Dec 95 p 3

[Report by Arlinda Causholli: "The State to the Ministries: 'There Is Your Budget for 1996'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—The ministers have been given their budgets for 1996. The Meksi cabinet held an extraordinary meeting yesterday for more than two and a half hours and approved all the minibudgets for the ministries next year. State revenue will amount to 61.5 billion leks [L] and expenditure L99.317 billion. This time, two areas of expenditure are missing from the state budget: Telekom and the energy sector will have their own surplus and deficit accounts, because parts of them are earmarked for privatization. Rural infrastructure, investments in transportation, agriculture, construction, education, and health will take priority in 1996. The Agriculture and Food Ministry has been allocated L700 million and the General Directorate of Forests has been given L40 million. The state will give the Construction Ministry L4.75 billion. In contrast to 1995, when housing took the lion's share, investments next year will be concentrated on the road network and the reconstruction of irrigation networks. The government has set aside L350 million for the Ministry of Industry and Transportation. In the coming months, city hospitals are to be renovated, The far from adequate conditions in which thousands of patients are treated will be at the center of the Health Ministry's attention, as senior officials confirm. This most sensitive ministry has been allocated L700 million. The recently approved bill has also laid stress on important educational projects, for which investment will amount to L960 million. Culture will receive L60 million, science L44 million, and sports L30 million. These are the sums distributed by the Meksi government. The bill will go before parliament for approval very soon.

Religious Institutions' Property To Be Returned

AU0301105396 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 20 Dec 95 p 3

[Report by A. Nikolla: "Return of Property of Religious Institutions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] God must have enlightened the president. Property will be returned. This good omen announced by President Berisha at a meeting with [Orthodox Archbishop] Janullatos has cheered the hearts of the leaders of Albania's religious communities. Now, when the law passes through parliament, 10,000 hectares of agricultural land, and olive groves at Durres, Ballsh, and Elbasan, not to forget seven large shops and the building of the University Dental Center, may be returned. After the return of Ardenice, the Orthodox Church will ask for 11 monasteries in the possession of the Albanian Army, and even the museums of the medieval art in Berat and Korce. The Catholics have a good deal of property in the north and in Tirana. His Grace Archbishop Janullatos told KOHA JONE: "Christmas is a time of surprises. It was a real cause for joy for us when the president told us we will have the monastery of Ardenice back, after four years of incessant pleading. We knew that God would hear our prayer and would move the hearts of President Berisha and the government. We are very behind in our work to turn these holy sites once again into places to illuminate the minds of the Albanians, and we hope that other sites, too, will be returned to us for the good not only of the Orthodox Church but of all Albanians. We can now say that dialogue has won and that this will pave the way for a fair and prompt settlement." Haxhi Hafiz Sabri Koci, the leader of the Muslim community, spoke enthusiastically: "This promise is excellent news for the religious communities,

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because now finally our property will be returned to us, and this is happening at Christmas, the festival of our Christian brothers. We have hitherto received nothing, and this is why our community is in financial straits that we can barely cope with. We hope that the president's decision will solve as soon as possible this problem that has hindered to such an extent the work of the religious communities. Property belongs to the denominations, and must be returned to them. Otherwise we will be dependent on foreign aid. The restitution of property will strengthen the religious communities, these institutions that represent people's faith, and will make normal life possible for them again. It means recognition for the faith to which we belong." Dom Rrok Mirdita, archbishop of Durres and Tirana, said: "I personally have not received any information about this promise of the president. We have expected the restitution of property for a long time, and this is perfectly normal. We have ascribed the delay so far to state bureaucracy."

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Article Assesses SDS Performance in 1995

AU0201140996 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 29 Dec 95 p 13

[Article by Valentin Stoev: "In 1995, the SDS Came to its Senses, but Not Completely"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The year 1995 is the first in the SDS's [Union of Democratic Forces] six years of existence in which its childhood illnesses—the separation of the "great" from the "small," of the moderates from the extremists—have progressed beyond the acute phase, but with no guarantee that, following a brief latent period, that they may turn out to be chronic complaints, not because the illnesses were treated with some sobering political antibiotic, but because the "great" have been finally expelled from the union by the "small." It is an indisputable fact that the SDS of 1995 is not the same as it was in 1994, let alone in 1993.

Ivan Kostov took Filip Dimitrov's seat on the white charger, and the horse immediately slowed from a gallop to a trot. Under Kostov the SDS slowed down in all spheres, but the most important development is that his leadership has realized (or as finally been forced to understand) a universal truth, namely, that, in the age of democracy, obstinacy and intolerance are more a hindrance than a help, and, moreover, absolutely guarantee that you will commit political blunders that frequently send you back to square one. This was precisely the situation in the SDS during Dimitrov's reign.

In 1995, the SDS for the first time found the strength to adjust its preannounced hardline position. After it had accused the last deserter—Stefan Savov's Democratic Party—of high treason, following its old habit, as the municipal elections drew near, it nevertheless tacitly permitted the formation of coalitions with Democratic Party at the local level, through the People's Union. This confirmed the thesis that, contrary to expectation, political flexibility helps rather than hinders. The election results, especially the distribution of the votes cast in the two ballots, proved this. It is a fact that Stefan Sofiyanski's victory would have been much more difficult if he had not been supported in the second round by the votes of Indzhova's supporters and People's Union adherents in general.

To sum up, in 1995 the SDS gave up struggling with itself, thus unleashing its energies—mainly intellectual ones—and redirecting them in the right direction, i.e., against its main political opponent, the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party]. Although it is difficult to say how far this has had a bearing, it is evident that, as regards the infighting within their coalitions, the two largest political forces will swap places. Within the BSP, hotbeds of conflict are increasingly flaring up, and now the BSP, in turn, is beginning to occupy itself more with its own internal problems.

In 1995 Ivan Kostov's SDS finally realized that, in its campaign in opposition, time may prove to be an ally if it adopts a clear, methodical, and consistent strategy, perfectly in the sense of the Latin maxim that the drop of water wears away the stone not by force but by frequent repetition. This is universally true. In other respects, the SDS committed mass blunders in the outgoing year. For example, during its almost two years in opposition, it failed to form even one shadow cabinet, although Videnov's cabinet contains plenty of dark places needing light to be shed upon them. The old stalwarts in the BSP did not fail to do this when they were in opposition, although this is a mere formality in the real political situation. A shadow cabinet is intended not so much to be a corrective for the government as to oppose the real cabinet and keep its own supporters in line, mobilizing them when needed, and generally preventing even the fiercest party warriors from losing interest in the politic scene.

Generally speaking, two mutually exclusive trends are evident even now in the SDS's actions regarding its electorate: On the one hand, there is political pseudoaristocratism, expressed in an almost complete lack of interest in how many old supporters you will lose and how many new ones you will gain for the cause, and on the other hand, astounding examples of political pettiness. Look here, the people at SDS headquarters say, we are in opposition, so we will not accept anything that the BSP dreams up. A flagrant example of this was the election of the new Bulgarian National Bank governor, although it was absolutely clear that a candidate proposed by the majority will inevitably be elected to this post, and although Paparizov is a truly acceptable candidate, even for the opposition.

During the year, the SDS continued to maintain its pigheaded attitude regarding President Zhelyu Zhelev, one of its founders. Under Kostov (as compared with the Filip Dimitrov era), Zhelev is no longer branded a traitor, but he is still regarded as the enemy of his own children, the present-day strong men in the SDS. This, of course, is their problem, but if, in this abnormal political year, the SDS managed to achieve anything, it was the union's ability to lose and then find explanations for its losses, which, of course, never lie within its own ranks.

It is true that Zhelev is a little worn and that his nerves are somewhat frayed, but in Bulgaria even the stray dogs suffers from tattered nerves. At the same time, it is no accident that we prefer to have a philosopher as head

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of state than a lawyer. A philosopher thinks in general terms, whereas a lawyer is always inclined toward the specific. In any case, God has given Bulgaria enough philosophers, let alone lawyers!

In 1995, the SDS finally came to its senses a little, but far from completely. However, wisdom, especially political wisdom, comes only with time. In two days it will be New Year's Eve, so I wish everyone many years of health and happiness!

Commentary Wants Public Council To Control Media

AU0201132596 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 28 Dec 95 p 6

[Commentary by Genka Markova: "A Test for Those in Power"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday National Assembly Chairman Blagovest Sendov held talks with correspondents from the Bulgarian National Radio and was unpleasantly surprised to hear that a draft law is being prepared that is almost identical to the media law in force in Turkey. Perhaps the idea of the Bulgarian model is to dissociate from the Balkans and draw closer to the basic European norms for public control over the national media. However, this is an extremely difficult issue because our politicians are unwilling to relinquish even a small part of the ground that they have won through the interim statute on the media.

The problem can only be resolved by setting up a public council whose membership is not subject to the dictate of the main parliamentary political forces and includes independent individuals with indisputable public authority and representatives of civic organizations. Only such a council will guarantee that a public radio and television will continue to exist in Bulgaria, protected from the pressure applied by politicians and powerful economic groups.

Sendov did not commit himself to any categorical viewpoint. Now the ball is in Prime Minister Videnov's court, and the public expects to hear his forthright personal view on how the national media should be used. Videnov does not have many choices. He must react, either as prime minister or as a party leader. Anything else will demonstrate that, in the Democratic Left, the right hand does not know what the left is doing.

Shutdown Preparation for Kozloduy 3d Reactor

AU0201163696 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 2 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Decreasing the capacity of the third reactor of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant has begun. On 2 January the capacity of the 440-megawatt reactor was decreased to 55 percent.

According to the plan, the reactor will be switched off on 10 January in conformity with the project of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

A complex reconstruction and modernization program of the reactor will be implemented in the next three months.

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Ministers Criticize Plans for Army Development

LD0201230696 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 2200 GMT 2 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A ministerial meeting today rejected material prepared by Defense Minister Vilem Holan on the current state and development of the Czech Army. Ales Hermanek has the details:

[Hermanek] The ministers behaved on this occasion in the same way they did nearly two months ago, when they failed to agree with the text of the first version of this document. It was to have breathed new life into the stalled process of transformation of the Army, which had been delayed by the absence of any vision regarding its future development. It was to have clarified the new organizational arrangements and the priorities in terms of weapon systems so as to achieve greater compatibility with NATO armies, as well as to set out procurement procedures for the Army.

According to the adviser to the prime minister, Jiri Weigl, the target of the ministers' strongest criticism was:

[Begin Weigl recording] Above all regarding the consistency of the material, its coherence and the quality of the analytical aspects of the evaluation of the present state of Army transformation and the way this is interlinked to the outline of the blueprint for the future. [end recording]

[Hermanek] Jiri Weigl went on to say that Vilem Holan, who had submitted the document, accepted the decision of the meeting.

[Begin Weigl recording] The defense minister listened to the discussion, listened to the points that were made, and will produce together with his ministry new documents that will satisfy the demands made at the ministerial meeting. [end recording]

Poll Shows President Most Trusted Institution

AU0201171396 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 29 Dec 95 p 3

[Report by "(mrk)": "People Trust the President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The president enjoys the most trust of all of the institutions in the Czech Republic. According to a poll conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion Research in December, 73 percent of the population trust him. Confidence in him has been between 71 and 73 percent during the past five months. A majority, 56 percent of citizens, trust the government. Trust in parliament has gone up slightly, as it did in the previous two months. Trust in it in December climbed to 31 percent from 24 percent in September. Most citizens—59 percent—do not, however, trust parliament.

Support for Institutions

	Jan 95	Jun 95	Dec 95
	Percent		
President	77	78	73
Government	58	53	56
Parliament	30	29	31

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Terminology Dispute With FRG To Be Settled

AU0201171696 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 30 Dec 95 p 1

[Article by "ns, od": "Prime Minister's Trips Next Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The dispute over the Slovak translation of Germany's official name could finally be settled as early as in January. According to reliable sources who do not wish to be named, this problem is to be solved during the Slovak prime minister's visit to Germany on 19-20 January of next year.

Vladimir Meciar is to participate in an international forum organized by the Bertelsmann Foundation. An agreement on the need for an expeditious solution to the problem over the translation of Germany's official name into the Slovak language was reached by the Slovak prime minister and Bundestag deputy Christian Schmidt during the latter's visit to Bratislava in December. This problem stands in the way of the conclusion of almost 20 contractual documents that are ready for signing.

The same source did not rule out that, during the forum, Vladimir Meciar might meet with FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl and, possibly, other official representatives of Germany. Emil Kuchar, director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Political Section, conceded Vladimir Meciar's participation in the conference in Germany but refused to comment on his official meeting with Chancellor Kohl.

We have managed to find out that the visit to Germany should not be the only foreign trip of the Slovak prime minister early next year. A visit to Ukraine is being prepared for the beginning of next year, as well as a trip to Belgrade, the FRY capital.

Ducky: Eastern Free Trade Area Not New CEMA

LD0201190096 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 2 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] CEFTA is the abbreviation for the Central European Free Trade Association, an association of which the members are our own country, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and, since yesterday, Slovenia. During the three years of its existence, the member countries have alternated at the head of this organization. On 1 January 1996 the chairmanship fell to us. My colleague Michal Dzurianin began by asking the holder of the post, Economy Minister Jan Ducky, what this meant for Slovakia:

[Begin recording] [Ducky] It means more work for us, but we look forward to it because it will allow Slovakia to head the joint committee for the meeting of prime ministers of CEFTA member states and of the states that have expressed an interest in joining CEFTA. [passage omitted]

[Tvarozek] Opinions on CEFTA vary. Some consider it to be CEMA under a new guise; others see it as a prerequisite for entry into the European Union. Minister, what is your position on this?

[Ducky] The date for full membership in the European Union is somewhere in the future, so it would be criminal not to act now and not to look after trade between these countries. It is not an alternative to the European Union, and we are certainly not fulfilling an ambition, as we have never had one, to form a new CEMA. On the contrary, we think that, in the interim, CEFTA could serve as proof that the transformation process in these countries is not an automatic one and that their governments are working on it and creating the necessary conditions.

[Tvarozek] What would be a realistic date for the admission of Romania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic states to CEFTA?

[Ducky] As a country that depends on exports and, given the character and size of its manufacturing industry and its relatively small home market, Slovakia has an eminent interest in the greatest possible acceleration of these processes. When depends on the fulfillment of conditions. Romania and Bulgaria are ahead in this. We signed a free trade agreement with Romania that took effect on 1 January 1995, and a similar agreement with Bulgaria took effect on 1 January 1996. These countries must sign similar agreements with the other CEFTA members, and they must also meet the general conditions that were prerequisites for our concluding free trade agreements with them. That means membership in the World Trade Organization, associate membership [in CEFTA], and of course bilateral free trade agreements. I would be delighted if those two countries were to become full members of CEFTA within two years. However, the process is a very complicated one. [passage omitted] [end recoring]

Poll Examines Attitudes to Partition of CSFR

AU0201174996 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 30 Dec 95 p 2

[Report by "r": "Views on CSFR's Partition Roughly the Same as One Year Ago"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The FOCUS agency carried out a representative public opinion poll from 1 to 11 December 1995. The poll involved 1,004 respondents, representative of the adult population of Slovakia in terms of sex, age, level of education, size

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of community of residence, region, and nationality. All data are in percent. For the sake of comparison, we also list respondents' replies to the same question a year ago, in December 1994.

	Dec 95	Dec 94
	Percent	
A. I advocated the partition of the CSFR from the beginning and have not changed my mind.	20.9	21.7
B. I advocated the CSFR's partition, but today I think it was a mistake.	8.4	8.3
C. I opposed the CSFR's partition, but today I think the partition was correct.	13.0	10.7
D. I opposed partition but have become reconciled to it.	26.7	27.8
E. I was opposed to the CSFR's partition from the beginning and have not become reconciled to it to the present day.	25.6	28.4
F. I do not know.	5.4	3.1

Only 29.3 percent of respondents (A + B, that is, 20.9 + 8.4 percent) say that they originally advocated the partition of the common state, while 65.3 percent of respondents (C + D + E, that is, 13.0 + 26.7 + 25.6 percent) say that they originally opposed the CSFR's partition.

A total of 33.9 percent (A + C, that is, 20.9 + 13.0 percent) identify with the CSFR's partition; 26.7 percent of respondents who originally did not wish it have become reconciled to it; and 34.0 percent (B + E, that is, 8.4 + 25.6 percent) still consider it wrong. Comparison with December 1994 data shows a slight decline in the proportion of people who have not become reconciled to the CSFR's partition (from 28.4 percent to 25.6 percent) and a slight increase in the proportion of people who originally opposed the CSFR's partition but who consider it correct today (from 10.7 percent to 13.0 percent). However, the views of citizens of the Slovak Republic on the CSFR's partition are, overall, considerably stable.

Views of citizens of the Slovak Republic on the CSFR's partition are distributed evenly among women and men, among various age categories, and among people with different levels of education. Marked differences in attitudes toward the CSFR's partition exist among supporters of various political parties. The majority of Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and Slovak National Party supporters consider the CSFR's partition correct (replies A + C). Among the supporters of the other parliamentary parties, this view is in the minority.

Nationalism Seen as Starting on 'Serbian Path'

AU0301113196 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 28 Dec 95 p 3

[Article by Peter Weiss, chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left: "Will Radical Nationalism Push Us Onto the Serbian Path?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR] finally got the Treaty on Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the Slovak and Hungarian Republics from the government for ratification, it was an event that caught the attention not only of the Slovak public, but also of the European and broader international public. Public-service Slovak Television [STV], however, did not consider this to be an event worthy of a live relay. It was the same with the law on the state budget. There will probably be no live relays based on the objective importance of this or that event in parliament, but based on whether the ruling coalition wants or has to make a show of something. The budget for the year of modesty certainly was not this something. Nor was it the ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty. Maybe the law on the protection of the Republic will be given a chance.

The STV's lack of interest in a live relay also contained an aura of the unintentional. It symbolized a shift in the view of the treaty by the ruling Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. Nine months ago, a major foreign policy accomplishment by the Slovak prime minister was being spoken about in the government's propaganda. Before the NR SR meeting, the prime minister was exposed to indiscriminate, although indirect, attacks on his person from the coalition ranks and from among the ranks of his own movement.

The following portentous words appeared in the decalogue of the Slovak National Party [SNS] on the treaty: "All nationally conscious Slovaks should reject such a treaty, and the Slovak Foreign Ministry should bear the consequences for drafting and signing this document." The consequences are not further specified, but it is clear that the Slovak who should bear the consequences for drafting and signing such a document is the prime minister and chairman of the coalition HZDS. Truly a unique coalition partnership!

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Is it necessary to seek better evidence that the ruling coalition is not united by the common concept of promoting long-term nation-state interests but is mainly "cemented together" by common privatization interests?

The SNS decalogue is, however, nothing compared with the leaflet that some HZDS deputies circulated in the NR SR under the title "Comments on the Draft Slovak-Hungarian Treaty." It contains accusations of a really heavy caliber directed at the person who dared to sign this treaty. According to the authors of the leaflet, the treaty is apparently not formulated on the principle of equality and reciprocity and lays down for us a very problematic, even bleak, future. Ratifying this treaty allegedly would be a mockery not only of the law, but also of common sense. Allegedly the repercussions of this treaty would be the gradual official loss of the Slovak Republic's sovereignty, the gradual collapse of its integrity, and the subsequent extinction of the Slovak Republic as an independent state unit.

Strong stuff indeed. I cannot imagine what the reaction of the ruling deputies would have been if something like this addressed to the prime minister had come from the opposition's workshop! If what is written in the leaflet is true and if those circulating it or who believe in its contents have at least a little self-respect, they should, in accordance with the Constitution, table a motion of no confidence in the prime minister. And, if the leaflet is not true and is yet another manifestation of extreme Slovak nationalism that plays into the hands of Hungarian nationalism (I am an advocate of this diagnosis), then the question arises: Why have none of the most senior government and HZDS officials deflected these attacks? Why are they nurturing an illusion about the possibility of reaching an agreement on the interpretation of the treaty between the Slovak and Hungarian Governments, even though the two foreign ministers, Schenk and Kovacs, have made it clear that this path is not viable? Is it really only a matter of the prime minister's prestige that the treaty's ratification not be dependent on the votes of the opposition? Will the authors of the "decalogue" and the leaflet modify their views in exchange for the approval of a law on the protection of the Republic?

I am asking these questions because far more fundamental and important questions are concealed behind them: Who actually controls parliament and sets the tone of state policy? Is it not these very authors of the "decalogue" and the leaflet who talk not about an independent but, rather, about a revived Slovak Republic and refuse to draw a thick line under the complicated Slovak-Hungarian past? Is it not those who, as the culmination of the national revolution, would be happy to rehabilitate President Tiso and the Ludakist regime of the fascist Slovak state?

Why does the prime minister refuse to link the present-day Slovak Republic to the wartime one and claim that, while he is in power, he will not rehabilitate the fascist Slovak state, but, at the same time, does not try (or does he not have the strength?) to "tackle" the bearers of these tendencies within the coalition SNS and in his own movement? And why are the deputies and representatives of the Association of Workers of Slovakia, who, after all, have always acknowledged the antifascist tradition of the Slovak National Uprising, indifferent (or deliberately silent) about these ever more conspicuous and self-confident attempts to glorify the wartime Slovak state? Why does the Slovak culture minister not only tolerate, but also generously financially support the activities of certain circles from the leadership of the Matica Slovenska [Slovak Heritage Foundation] in their clear endeavor to glorify Monsignor Tiso? Who is interested in making sure that the historical tradition the Slovak Republic, established on 1 January 1969 and independent as of 1 January 1993, upholds is revised?

The series of questions has its own logical continuation: Is the increase in the SNS's influence within the coalition, supported by the radical and irreconcilable nationalists in the HZDS in return for silence about the political background to the privatization decisions made by the nine men in the National Property Fund [FNM] Presidium, decisions that are also causing the Presidium's president to lose sleep, not becoming ever more evident? And will the cost of this privatization omerta [Mafia code of silence] not be too high for Slovakia? If the radical nationalists assert themselves in the ruling coalition, which will inevitably strengthen the Hungarian extremists, will this not bring with it a risk that Slovakia may be pushed unnoticed onto the Serbian path?

All of this forms an invisible background to the parliamentary game called the ratification process. In other words, either the extremists will be shoved aside to where they belong in all democratic societies—that is, to the edge of the political spectrum—or they will call the political tune. In my opinion, this will be one of the main issues in Slovak politics in 1996.

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Carnogursky Interrogated on Charges Filed by Meciar

AU0201160396 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 29 Dec 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Nora Sliskova: "Vladimir Meciar Charged Jan Carnogursky With Spreading an Alarmist Report"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The dramatic case of the president son's abduction abroad exacted its toll also immediately after the Christmas holidays. On Wednesday, 27 December, a police investigator interrogated in Bratislava Jan Carnogursky, chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], who was asked to provide an explanation for two legal complaints brought against the KDH chairman by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and Ivan Lexa, director of the Slovak Information Service [SIS].

Carnogursky informed us that the complaint filed against him by Vladimir Meciar consists of two points. In the first point, the prime minister charges the Christian Democratic leader with spreading an alarmist report. According to the prime minister, Carnogursky made himself guilty of this when he recently declared that the investigation of the kidnapping of the president's son would continue after the change of government. The second part of the legal complaint concerns Carnogursky's alleged statement that the prime minister is personally involved in the kidnapping. Regarding the first point, Carnogursky told the investigator that he affirms his statement, which, however, he does not consider to be an instance of spreading an alarmist report. The second statement was not made in the form as interpreted by Meciar, and Carnogursky therefore demands that it be set right. Ivan Lexa's legal complaint is connected with Jan Carnogursky's words that there exists a serious suspicion of the SIS's participation in the kidnapping. The KDH chairman made this statement on 11 October at a joint session of several parliamentary clubs held after an extraordinary session of parliament. At that time Jan Carnogursky called Ivan Lexa a "criminal."

Commenting on the entire affair in an interview for PRAVDA, Carnogursky said that he considers Ivan Lexa's and Vladimir Meciar's initiative ridiculous. "This does not worry me. In the past, under communism, I underwent dozens of such interrogations, and I could always cope with them," Jan Carnogursky told us.

First Home Guard Unit To Operate in Zilina

AU0201190096 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 29 Dec 95 p 2

[Report by TASR: "First Specialists From Home Guard Training Center"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zilina—The first approximately 90 specialists for Army of the Slovak Republic [ASR] guard units have been trained by the Zilina-based Home Guard Training Center since its establishment on 1 October 1995. The Home Guard Training Center was established on the basis of a National Council of the Slovak Republic resolution, in keeping with the Slovak Government Policy Statement on the establishment of the Home Guard as a special type of ASR ground troops. As was stated by Lieutenant Colonel Stefan Palaj, authorized [splnomocneny] commander of the Home Guard Training Center, this is the first and only army training center of its kind in Slovakia. The building of the training center still continues. Specialists for the ASR will be trained in the NCO and reserve officers' school according to the requirements of individual ASR units in Slovakia.

[Bratislava SME in Slovak on 27 December on page 3 carries a 300-word CTK report on a Slovak National Party (SNS) briefing entitled "SNS: First Home Guard Unit Will Go Into Operation in Zilina on 1 January." Asked about the SNS's "successes" in 1995, SNS Deputy Chairwoman Anna Malikova reportedly singled out "the approval of the law on the state language, the gradual introduction of alternative education, and the establishment of the home guard, the first unit of which will operate in Zilina as of 1 January."]

Government Approves Amendment to Trade Union Law

AU0201194896 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 30 Dec 95 p 2

[Report by TASR: "According to Amendment, Word of the Largest Trade Union Organization Will Be Valid"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Preventing the blockage of collective bargaining in organizations in which there exist several trade union organizations, in case of their failure to agree within a set time frame on a common course of action, is the aim of an amendment the Government of the Slovak Republic approved

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at its meeting on 19 December. As Jana Burdova, spokeswoman for the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, and the Family, informed TASR, the position of the trade union organization with the largest number of members will be considered decisive, according to the planned proposal. This safety mechanism, which should prevent social tension, is to be used only in exceptional cases. At its 19 December session, the government also approved a partial amendment specifying which entities can conclude collective agreements. This amendment has been made necessary by the vague formulations of the existing law, which permit its ambiguous interpretation in practice. The proposed changes concern the extent of state participation in collective bargaining. The proposal also introduces the institute [institut] of supplement to the collective agreement.

Poll Surveys Citizens' Financial Situation

AU0201140696 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 29 Dec 95 p 2

[Report by TASR: "Financial Situation of Households Has Improved"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"What is the financial situation of your household today, compared with the situation a year ago?" was one of the questions put to 1,004 respondents in a public opinion poll conducted by the FOCUS agency from 1 to 11 December 1995. The sample was representative of the adult population of Slovakia in terms of sex, age, level of education, size of community of residence, region, and nationality. The financial situation of their household has improved markedly according to 2.5 percent (1.0) of respondents, has improved somewhat according to 20.8 percent (11.4), has remained approximately the same according to 42.0 percent (26.1 percent), has deteriorated somewhat according to 24.0 percent (32.5 percent), and has deteriorated markedly according to 10.2 percent (27.0). A total of 0.5 percent (2.1) of those polled were unable to answer. Asked to estimate the financial situation of their household five years from now, compared with the present situation, 5.3 percent (5.8) of those polled said that it will improve markedly, 22.5 percent (21.6) that it will improve somewhat, 23.1 percent (22.6) that it will remain approximately the same, 12.4 percent (17.4) that it will deteriorate somewhat, and 4.4 percent (8.1 percent) that it will deteriorate markedly. A total of 32.3 percent (24.5) of those polled were unable to answer. The figures in parentheses are from an analogous survey conducted in 1994.

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Keleti Comments on Bosnia, NATO, Perry Visit

LD0301120496 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0545 GMT 3 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Complete success—this is the assessment of the visit by U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry and John Shalikashvili, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Taszar and Kaposvar. [passage omitted]

Laszlo Farago reports on Perry's visit.

[Farago] The first to arrive were Generals Joulwan and Crouch, then came U.S. Ambassador to Hungary Donald Blinken. Also traveling in the aircraft was Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti. Finally, an enormous C-17 landed carrying Gen. Shalikashvili and Secretary of Defense Perry, who went to the microphone for the first time a few minutes later for an impromptu news conference. [passage omitted]

Perry then handed over to Keleti.

[Begin Keleti recording] We would accept a role in the creation of peace in Bosnia even if there was no Partnership for Peace process, because we believe that peace must be created in Bosnia. We are able to cooperate very well within the framework of Partnership for Peace, we are learning from one another, and in this way, we are preparing for admission to NATO. [end recording]

[Farago] When will the issue of who protects the Hungarian contingent in IFOR [Implementation Force] be clarified? This was the next question.

[Begin Keleti recording] We must sort out this issue with the IFOR command at NATO, not with Mr. Perry, and the question will be put on the agenda very soon. It is our joint responsibility that the Hungarians should serve in maximum safety. That is, the risk must minimized — no one denies the fact that there is a risk. [end recording] [passage omitted]

On Visit From President Clinton

LD0301094396 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0800 GMT 3 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti, it is conceivable that the U.S. President will visit Hungary after Bosnia. Keleti told the television program "Daybreak" that during talks, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry promised he would recommend that President Clinton visit the base in Taszar.

The defense minister said that British troops serving with IFOR [Implementation Force] will protect the Hungarian technical units in Bosnia. Keleti also said that the ministry would soon initiate informal contacts with the leadership of the Bosnian Serb army, because the Hungarian soldiers will serve in areas that in part are under its control.

Views Tasks, Security of Troops

AU0301173496 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 3 Jan 96 pp 1-2

[Unattributed report: "Satellite Contact With the Hungarian Battalion"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] For their security, the Hungarian peacekeeping technical staff will be equipped with especially modern satellite telecommunications equipment. The defense minister also considers it possible for the Hungarian side to make informal contact with the local commanders of the Bosnian Serb army because our troops will be partly working in areas controlled by them. NEPSZABADSAG received Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti's letter to NATO's European commander, which contains the Hungarian stance on the purpose and the security of the Hungarian unit.

A Hungarian military unit has never had the kind of modern telecommunications equipment that will be supplied to the technical battalion heading for the Croatian-Bosnian border, Keleti told our correspondent. The satellite telecommunications equipment will make it possible to make immediate contact, which can be of vital significance in unforeseeable situations. In addition to the modern telecommunications equipment, some 310 million forints are being spent on higher quality clothing—in which bulletproof vests are also included—and on other pieces of equipment. In addition to this, life and accident insurance will be taken out for all members of the Hungarian battalion.

Keleti emphasized that the tasks of the unit were assigned in such a way that it will, in all probability, also be able to rely on the sympathy of the civilian population. The unit will maintain roads and bridges that are vital for contacts between villages and towns, as well as for the movement of the IFOR [Implementation Force] troops.

Referring to the domestic and foreign statements on the security of the Hungarian soldiers, Keleti said: They are making every effort for this. It is even possible to have an informal dialogue with the leadership of the Bosnian Serb army because the Hungarian soldiers will partly work in areas lying under the control of this army. [passage omitted]

As a matter of fact, Keleti also said in a statement on 2 January that a condition for the participation of the Hungarian soldiers is that they receive the highest possible security guarantees.

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Plans To Stop Refugees From Former Yugoslavia

LD0201201196 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 2 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A total of 75,000 refugees from former Yugoslavia entered Hungary between 1991 and 1995. Presently, there are only 8,500 and they must decide whether to stay here or to make use of the assistance on offer and return home. It emerges from Edit Fekete's report that further refugees from the region will not be allowed to come here.

[Fekete] The government will issue a decree in the coming weeks saying that Hungary cannot take in further refugees from former Yugoslavia. Bela Jungbert, director general of the Office for Refugee and Migration Affairs, says that the reason for the decision is that the war in the territory of former Yugoslavia has ended—that is, the conditions giving rise to persecution have ceased to exist.

A decree to this effect has been passed already in Germany and Austria. All of the countries now face a new task: to assist the refugees in returning home. This does not mean forced expulsion or deportation, either.

The asylum-seekers' residence permits will be extended in Hungary in the future. They will be given state support, but the amount of this will constantly decrease since the Hungarian authorities proceed from the fact that nothing now prevents the safe return home of the refugees from former Yugoslavia.

SZDSZ Assesses Economic Processes in 1995

AU0201175096 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 29 Dec 95 p 5

[Report by "cs.h.": "According to the SZDSZ, 1995 Was a Turning Point—the Debt Has To Be Reduced"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] approves of parliament's decision to spend a certain proportion of the extra privatization income on reducing the state debt. At the SZDSZ's year-end news conference held on 28 December, Ivan Peto, party and parliamentary group chairman, and executive Tamas Bauer, the party's economic philosopher, said that, although 1995 had been a very difficult year, it had nevertheless brought a turning point in the Hungarian economy. After the delays of many years, the government at last made the decisions which will facilitate the beginning of development. "The series of measures which reduces the living standards did not make the Horn government too popular, but popularity cannot be the only measure for a government with responsible politics, anyway," Peto said. Bauer noted that trade had not closed with a profit, even at Christmas, and people had not bought much, but this was no wonder because the current 10-percent real wage decrease is unprecedented since 1951-52. "Considering all this, I can only think with the highest appreciation for the population's patience," Peto said.

Assessing parliament's work, Peter Hack [SZDSZ MP] especially emphasized the laws on the environment, privatization, national security, and the media. He said the new rule in the parliamentary procedures during the Horn government, according to which parliament can set up a committee to investigate any issue at the request of 25 percent of the MPs, hold a significant guarantee. In his view, there is a chance for the new constitution to be accepted in 1996.

Bauer said that the opposition's accusation that the government planned unfounded privatization incomes proved wrong; in fact, the government made the forint convertible. A journalist remarked that Horn had recently said the use of the privatization incomes might have to be reconsidered in January. In connection with this, Bauer emphasized that parliament made the correct decision when it said that some of this income had to be spent on reducing the state debt. He noted that a prime minister's task is to implement parliament's decisions, rather than to question them. Peto added that it could not be claimed that the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] parliamentary group did not know what it was deciding on when it voted on the use of the extra privatization income, because this had been the sole issue discussed at a previous one-hour extraordinary parliamentary group session. According to Bauer, the real value of interests will decrease in 1996; therefore, the interest burden will also decrease faster. He emphasized that the Horn government pursues a growth-friendly policy which is unprecedented in the region. The SZDSZ's three politicians did not wish to assess the performance of Privatization Minister Tamas Suchman, even at the request of journalists, saying that they would not send messages to an MSZP member government minister through an SZDSZ news conference. "Since we acknowledged that a privatization ministerial position would be set up in the government and that Suchman would fill this, we have not criticized him," Bauer said. He admitted that initially they were not satisfied with the speed of privatization, and they now find it welcome, partly due to the fact that much more money has been paid to the state in the end than was originally planned.

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Poll Looks at Financial Situation, Expectations

AU0201185996 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 29 Dec 95 pp 1, 5

[Unattributed report: "What Kind of 1996 Will We Have?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the end of 1995, using a national sample of 1,000 people representing the population according to gender, age, and type of settlement, the Marec> Ltd. examined how the population assessed the year 1995 and what they expected of 1996 regarding their own and their families' financial situation.

Official statistics reported a significant reduction of real wages in 1995. This is also reflected in the population's assessment of their situation.

Three quarters of the people felt that their own and their families' financial situation had deteriorated during the year: 40 percent reported a small degree of deterioration and 34 percent a large degree of deterioration. Only 8 percent of the questioned people experienced improvement in their financial situation. This distribution of opinions well reflects the true content of the situation assessments, according to which the already large income differences between various groups of the population continued to grow. A small strata's improved living standards stand in contrast with the worsening living standards of the large majority.

Significant differences do not exist between the major groups of society in the way they see their financial situation. Most people experienced a more or less worsening tendency in the age groups over 60. In contrast, the proportion of those who have noticed an improvement in their situation is somewhat higher among people with high-level education and in the highest income groups. (Sixty-four percent of the latter noticed a worsening of the situation and 12 percent an improvement).

As to the expectations for 1996, a larger section of society expects further worsening in the situation. It is true, though, that the majority of these only expect a minor worsening.

Over-60 age groups, and generally pensioners and people with the lowest level of schooling, are the most pessimistic about their 1996 prospects. Of them, seven to eight people expect further worsening of the situation.

For 1996, the proportion of optimistic people is slightly higher than in the assessment of 1995. Some 11 percent of the questioned people expect an improvement in their own and their families' financial situation. This proportion is 17 percent among those with the highest level of education and 14 percent among people in the highest income bracket. The proportion of optimistic expectations is 19 percent among citizens below the age of 30, but the proportion of pessimists (60 percent) is much higher even in this group.

In assessments of their own financial situation, it has to be taken into consideration that due to significant inflation, people see their situation worsening even when it is unchanged, and a minor deterioration is perceived to be much bigger. Nevertheless, the opinions cannot be seen as unjustifiably pessimistic: The population's opinion essentially coincides with the 1996 expectations formulated by experts.

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Sacirbegovic Holds Talks With OSCE Mission Head

LD0201235196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 2 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic held talks with Robert Frowick, chief of the mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], and his aides. After the talks, Frowick and Sacirbegovic issued statements for the radio of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mehmedalija Sisic has the details:

[Begin recording] [Sisic] After saying that the main goal of the talks was how to implement the practical coordination of everybody included in the process of elections to non-governmental organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and European organizations on these issues, Mr. Robert Frowick expounded upon some practical questions.

[Frowick, in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] According to what we understood, the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina will organize a small team of experts that will act in the field. Generally speaking, I think that we made a very good start for future work.

[Sisic] Speaking about the meeting with Mr. Frowick, Minister Sacirbegovic said the following:

[Sacirbegovic] In this exchange of views I was very clear, that is, I said that we expect that this tradition of democracy and human rights will be demonstrated [word indistinct] Mr. Frowick, so that nobody will try to use Mr. Frowick to make it possible for the U.S. troops to withdraw after one year, because he can confirm that the elections were really democratic (?although this was not the case). He confirmed to me that, in his report, he will work only where there are conditions for really democratic elections, and that he as a man could not put up with any attempt to use him for some other political aims, even if this might relate to U.S. troops withdrawing within a year, as President Clinton promised the American people.

Finally, I think even America understands that if the process can be concluded in a year, fine, but if it cannot, it is better that they remain at a certain level, and really do a real job, than withdraw somewhere in the middle, so that everything for which they sacrificed such a lot of resources, a lot of money, will go bad. Finally, in Bosnia some sort of U.S. legacy will remain, and that is if Bosnia [word indistinct] reintegrates [words indistinct] this will really be a political and democratic success, and if it comes to the strengthening of the federal forces, then both Bosnia [words indistinct].

[Sisic] The latest incidents by Serbs in Ilidza were a special topic touched upon in the Sacirbegovic-Frowick talks.

[Sacirbegovic] It can be seen now that there is perhaps much more (?reality), that this process of integration does not go [word indistinct], and that Sarajevo will remain under a siege even longer. [Words indistinct] and he supported the idea that an even greater engagement is needed both by his office and IFOR [Implementation Force]. [end recording]

EU Mostar Envoy: One Year Not Enough for Peace

BR0201142796 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 31 Dec 95 p 2

[Report on interview with Julian Garcia Vargas, former Spanish defense minister and EU envoy in Mostar, by Miguel Gonzalez in Madrid; date not given: "The Atlantic Alliance Will Have To Stay Longer Than One Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Madrid — When he was Spain's defense minister between 1992 and June 1995, Julian Garcia Vargas went six times to Bosnia. Two weeks ago he went back there, this time as EU envoy to Mostar, where 18 months of EU administration have not succeeded in healing the wounds of the war between Muslims and Croats.

"The EU was aware that the administration of Mostar was becoming increasingly difficult, and that the peace process in Mostar — the city where it had advanced most — is slowing down. The EU therefore decided to send over a representative to call upon all parties that might influence a speeding up of the peace process without using the events occurring in the rest of Bosnia as an excuse."

Garcia Vargas is finishing a memorandum on the four objectives of the Mostar agreement included in the Dayton peace plan, which he will submit to the EU ministers in January. These objectives are the free movement of persons and the provision of accommodation for refugees, the establishment of a unified police force, the elaboration of bylaws, and the organization of local elections in May.

After visiting Mostar, Sarajevo, and Zagreb, he thinks that "the authorities intend to implement the accords, but in the city of Mostar itself there are many extremists who want to obstruct their implementation."

In his opinion the most delicate problem is the police, "without whom there will be no respect for human rights, while it is not certain that it will be possible to hold the elections," he said, adding that "it is impossible

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to form a police force with former adversaries who were fighting each other. It is being considered that at least a part of the force should consist of policemen from outside Mostar."

Garcia Vargas thinks that the international community's means to put pressure on the people are limited, and he wonders "to what extent families that seem irreconcilable can be obliged to live as neighbors in the same area." "Many displaced persons," he added, "did not want to return, even though they were given security guarantees." Therefore, it is important that private property is respected, so that "everybody can decide to go back home or to sell their house and buy another one elsewhere."

The former minister will recommend that the EU "hinge its financial aid on the city's situation returning to normalcy. It must make it clear to the authorities that they have to forget about old scores if they want the city to be reconstructed." Beyond the Dayton accord, he added, "there is another essential goal: to provide the refugees with appropriate accommodation and to reopen the factories, so that most people can become involved in the peace process and it becomes increasingly difficult for extremists to break it. This is the only guarantee which we have."

In view of his Mostar experience, Vargas thinks that one year is not enough to consolidate peace as planned by NATO. "The problem of this mission is that it is very expensive, and the public in our countries will become weary of it, whereas NATO will probably need two to three times as much time as we are willing to give it. Many are already wondering what will happen when NATO quits. It is too early to answer this question, but one year will probably not be enough. I have the impression that NATO will have to stay longer than one year, but we have to make it clear that it cannot stay for ever."

IFOR: Mujahidin 'Moving Out in Large Numbers'

AU0201191196 Paris AFP in English 1850 GMT 2 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 2 (AFP) — Islamic volunteer fighters who must leave Bosnia within days under the Dayton peace agreement are moving out "in large numbers" the commander of NATO-led peacekeeping troops in Bosnia said Tuesday.

"We have very good evidence that mujahedeen are moving out in large numbers," US Navy Admiral Leighton Smith said during a live Bosnian Serb television phone-in show.

Under the Dayton peace accord, signed December 14 in Paris, all foreign forces must leave Bosnia within 30 days of the agreement's signing. The clause affects all troops and paramilitary not of local origin, but was specifically aimed at the mujahedeen.

The Islamic volunteers, who come from an array of Moslem countries and include veterans of the Afghan war, have fought alongside the mainly Moslem government army against Bosnian Serb troops since the beginning of the war.

Their presence was a particular concern for the United States, which is in the process of deploying some 20,000 ground troops to Bosnia to implement the accord as part of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR).

Bosnia's government has pledged to ensure that the Islamic fighters, who in the past have clashed with British UN peacekeepers, move out.

Smith said: "We are confident that the Bosnian government is in fact causing the mujahedeen to leave."

It is estimated that some 2,000 to 3,000 Islamic volunteers were in Bosnia at the height of the conflict in mid-1995. Officials contacted in Smith's headquarters in Sarajevo said they could give no further details of the withdrawal of the volunteers.

Creation of Anti-IFOR 'Terrorist Groups' Rumored

AU0201191096 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 29 Dec 95

[Report by Marko Draganic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Feliks Vargas, political advisor to U.S. General William Nash, and his associates visited Brcko today as guests of Brcko Mayor Milorad Pajic. Marko Draganic has a report on this.

[Draganic] In the talks, which lasted two hours, the officials of Brcko informed Mr. Vargas of the need for repairs to the town infrastructure.

"I cannot promise you that it will all be done, as the IFOR [Implementation Force] mission is primarily a military one, but what I do know is that your questions will be forwarded to the right addresses. I can tell you right now that we will need large quantities of construction material to reconstruct the roads, which will, after we leave, be in much better condition than they are now," said Mr. Vargas. The political advisor to Gen. Nash also said that the war in this region was definitely over, and that it was necessary to turn toward peace in order to get over the difficult consequences of the terrible war as soon as possible. Mr. Vargas

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added that he was pleasantly surprised with the mildness and cooperativeness of his hosts. "I will inform the American people very early next year that the Serbs are not the bad guys," said Mr. Vargas.

Following the remarks of Slavko Guvzic, assistant commander of the Eastern Bosnian Corps for relations with IFOR, that there was reliable information that the command of the Muslim army in Gradacac is preparing terrorist groups consisting of Serbs loyal to Alija Izetbegovic that are to assassinate IFOR members, Vargas said that this was the first he had heard of it, but that if such cases prove true, though they are cause for much concern, they would be prevented in cooperation with the Russians.

At the end of today's meeting, Mr. Vargas asked the people of Brcko not to see the U.S. troops as enemies, but rather as partners who will, after a year, leave behind a lot of good, particularly as far as infrastructure facilities are concerned.

'Reliable Intelligence Information'

LD2912222095 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2040 GMT 29 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Brcko, 29 December (SRNA) — During his first official visit to Brcko, Feliks Vargas, political adviser to the commander of IFOR's [Implementation Force] U.S. division, said "the war in this area is definitely over" and the time had now come to "fight against the horrendous consequences of the war in peacetime." [passage omitted]

The assistant commander of the Eastern Bosnia Corps of the [Bosnian] Serb Army in charge of relations with IFOR, Slavko Guzvic, warned of reliable intelligence information that the Muslims from Gradacac were training terrorist groups, consisting of Serb mercenaries, for attacks on IFOR members.

"This is the first time I have heard of it. If it's true, we would be seriously concerned," said Vargas, and added that such intentions, if they existed, would be discovered soon, and these groups prevented from cooperation with Russian troops stationed in the area.

Vargas also had a message for the people of Brcko — that "they do not look on U.S. soldiers as enemies, but as partners who will leave a lot of good things behind them after a year, especially roads and infrastructure."

Serbs Offer Territory Exchange in Northeast

LD0201214296 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 2 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Over the past few days there has been a lot of debate — and many proposals in the mixed military commissions in Posavina — on peace and the borders. The borders are still not fully known in the northern part of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, in the Orasje area, which has already become a former battlefield.

The Serb side has raised objections and sought adjustments to the border in the region of (Tursinovac) and (Ledenice). It has also offered an exchange of territory around Ostra Luka, which, according to the Paris agreement, belongs to the Serbs, for the general region of Savski Most near [Bosanski] Samac. Cijetko Savic is president of the Serb part of the commission for the exchange of territory. We asked him what had been agreed to in this field.

[Begin Savic recording] With regard to the border in the northern sector, here in front of us, on the northern part of the Posavina front, this border, or some parts of it, are very favorable for us, above all we get Ostra Luka here. Ostra Luka is a village we are interested in. You know, we have in our area a good many refugees, displaced persons, and uncared-for families who need a roof over their head. We hope that when the border is established we will be able to use this village, reorganize it, and settle in it that part of the population that currently does not have a roof over its head. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Reports Suggest Karadzic Now 'Hiding' in Belgrade

AU0301120996 Paris AFP in English 1157 GMT 3 Jan 96

[Report by Jean-Pierre Campagne: "Bosnian Serb Leader Goes Into Hiding as NATO Troops Move In"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan 3 (AFP) — Bosnian Serb leader and indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic, who once boasted his troops would attack NATO forces that tried to arrest him, has gone to ground now NATO has arrived in Bosnia.

Breaking with traditional practice, Karadzic failed to broadcast a New Year's greeting this year, and has been conspicuously absent from the streets of Pale, self-styled capital of the Bosnian Serb republic, in recent days.

His silence and political retreat coincides with the beginning of NATO's mission to enforce peace in Bosnia, the arrival of U.S. soldiers and the first contacts between Bosnian Serb leaders, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Karadzic, along with his army chief Ratko Mladic, is wanted for crimes against humanity by the UN international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at The Hague.

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Under the terms of the Dayton peace accord signed in Paris last month, both men are thereby barred from holding future public office.

On Monday, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel reminded signatories to the U.S.-brokered peace accord of their pledges — that war criminals in the former Yugoslavia must be "punished and not forgotten."

Karadzic, well known for his volubility during the three and a half year Balkan conflict, is apparently trying to fade from public attention.

International attention has instead been centred on the deployment of the U.S. army in Bosnia, battling grim weather conditions to construct a bridge over the River Sava.

According to unconfirmed reports from Pale, Karadzic has been in Belgrade incognito over the past few days.

His former ally in the quest for a Greater Serbia, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, has cast him off, as he is now more of a political liability than an asset.

Milosevic is more preoccupied with his future role as a main player in the Balkans peace process and the main partner of U.S. realpolitik in the region.

"The man is a real politician, he doesn't heed sentiment," an observer said.

In Pale meanwhile it is Momcilo Krajisnik — number two in the Bosnian Serb leadership and parliament speaker — who has slipped into Karadzic's shoes.

He was the one who received Admiral Leighton Smith, overall commander of the NATO-led Implementation Force, and the OSCE delegations, in the past few days.

But he has refused to give any indication on the future of Karadzic, except to say that all leaders could not stay in power eternally "as they wished."

The independent Belgrade daily [as received] VREME, quoted Karadzic's inner circle as saying he "is ready to appear before the (tribunal) and is currently preparing his defence."

The newspaper was careful to separate Karadzic's case from Mladic's, saying that "Milosevic needs Mladic" to complete the demobilisation of the Bosnian Serb troops.

Rumours are also rife in Pale on discontent which could erupt once the soldiers — who had been promised "final victory" by Karadzic rather than defeat — are demobilised.

General elections to be held in May in the Serb-controlled part of Bosnia should sanction the disappearance from the political scene of the psychiatrist turned war criminal.

Karadzic, an avid poker player, must know that his luck has turned.

Commentary Indicates Serb Rejection of Karadzic

AU0301102696 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (Europe Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 21-28 Dec 95 p 2

[Commentary by Gojko Beric: "Karadzic's Last Trench"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Many journalists have reported that the people of Sarajevo are indifferent toward the Dayton agreement. I do not know whether this indifference is due to the provisions of the agreement itself or is an indifference toward peace in general. There is probably a little of each. The people of Sarajevo seem to feel that the experiment on them has not yet come to an end. Its last phase is still being kept secret, after which various expert researchers into the limits of human endurance will be able to publish the results of their experiment. This has all become not only disgusting, but also disgustingly boring, regardless of whether it concerns the deprivation of natural gas, electricity, and water or the mass dissemination of Karadzic's lies.

The problem is that the Western media thrive on excitement and not on truth. The choreographed rallies in Grbavica or Vogosca [Serb-occupied parts of Sarajevo] are of far more interest to them than an analysis of Izetbegovic's speech, which was in every respect the best that was heard during the signing of the Dayton agreement. The West is increasingly tightening the noose around Karadzic's neck, but Western television companies will grasp any new dramatic move that the war criminal might dream up. The media's spotlights have for days now been directed on the part of Sarajevo that is under Karadzic's control, the last trench before his command post in Pale. Once that trench falls, so will Karadzic. And this is why he keeps postponing the moment with such determination.

However, it is unthinkable that so many media help him in this. In the course of this war, Karadzic has been shown on CNN more than any politician in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Once, asked why the Serbs were shelling Sarajevo, he answered completely calmly: "We are not doing this; the Muslims are." The journalist listened to the lie without expressing any sign of disagreement. Now, having used up all his main tricks, Karadzic is defending his last trench at all costs. He organized the demonstrations, but never appeared at them himself, believing that his absence was the best evidence of their spontaneity. When the several days of tumult calmed down, he told the manipulated Serbs that they would be able to move to a "new city" that Milosevic was

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supposed to build for them. He did not say where it was going to be.

The Bosnian Serbs are a tragic example of mass manipulation. Not many people felt sorry for the Germans after World War II. The defeated Serbs deserve no pity, either. The majority of them are probably aware of this, as many have taken part in the mass crimes against the Bosniaks and Croats or have passively watched the killing of their neighbors and the burning of their houses. That is why they fled the towns of western Bosnia so silently. Overcome with fear because of their own guilt, they did not demonstrate against anybody. The choreographed rallies that Karadzic directed in occupied Sarajevo testify to the disorientation and moral misery of these manipulated people. This is because, for the great majority, those are not their own houses or flats, so their emotions could not have been sincere. Only a few days passed before the slogan "This is Ours" was replaced by the scenes of first departures.

In those scenes of departure there is a certain symbolism: Anticipating the end of Karadzic, the people took their suitcases and turned their backs on him. That they did this too late is their problem. When one takes a better look at it, Karadzic's position is becoming increasingly difficult. One should remember the motto with which he went into the war: Life together with Croats and Muslims is impossible! That, of course, was a great lie, but Karadzic thought up an infernal plan to prove the theory. That is why Serb crimes were the objective, and not, as is usually thought, the means to conduct this war. But no loser has ever given up his idea, and Karadzic has not, either, though aware that his own plan has become his visa to The Hague. Hitler killed himself still with the conviction that he was right. Karadzic is still not sure what he should do, although he is aware that the part of Sarajevo that he controls could, at least as a metaphor of destiny, become his Berlin and Pale his last bunker.

Article Profiles New HDZ President Ivo Lozancic

AU0201215396 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 9 Dec 95 p 3

[Report by Djuro Kozar: "Tudjman's Player"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a few days, the Central Committee of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] of Bosnia-Herzegovina is expected to appoint Ivo Lozancic as its president. He has been deputy president of the party and deputy defense minister of the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia. In nominating him for this position, the Presidency of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina obviously had in mind the continuity of its political activity established by Mate Boban in March 1992, when he replaced Stjepan Kljuic in Siroki Brijeg. Since then, the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been a branch office of Zagreb.

Cooperation With the Chetniks

Who is Ivo Lozancic?

He was born in 1958 in Ozimica near Zepce. For a while, he worked in the Zenica iron and steel plant, commuting from Zepce. After that, he graduated from the Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, majoring in national defense. He was one of the founders of the HDZ in Zepce and the first president of its municipal council. While Kljuic was head of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the man from Zepa was, from the very top of the community's structure, always prominently inclined towards Zagreb.

Lozancic is a typical Tudjman player. In an interview for SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in the spring of 1992, he said that "the only way out for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats is to establish connections with the Republic of Croatia, and their leadership cannot be in Sarajevo, but only in Zagreb." It is from this attitude that first the so-called Croat Community of "Herzeg-Bosnia," and later the Croat Republic of "Herzeg-Bosnia" resulted. With it, the Herzegovina Croats cheated the Bosnian ones, renouncing Bosanska Posavina, which fell "overnight" and became Serb.

The future president of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina did not settle for merely political activity; he took up military activity too. In the spring of 1992, he formed the 111th Zepa Brigade of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] and was its first commander. That year, Lozancic cooperated extensively with the Chetniks. After he expelled the Bosniaks from Zepce, he gave Novi Seher, and even part of Zepce to Karadzic. After the Chetniks withdrew from the town following the Washington Agreement, only ruins remained. During the armed conflict between the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO, Lozancic proved to be very brutal towards Bosniaks.

A Representative in Another Country

It was precisely during the Bosniak-Croat conflict that Ivo Lozancic seemed to accumulate his references in the top structures of "Herzeg-Bosnia," and, naturally, in the presidential palace. This is why his promotion to the rank of major general and his appointment to the position of deputy defense minister of the para-state represent a recognition of his overall contribution to the "Croat cause" in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Later, he was presented with other two signs of recognition: membership of the Chamber of Representatives of the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia, to which he was

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elected by the diaspora last month, and nomination to the highest position in the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Those who are well informed about the situation in "Herzeg-Bosnia" say that General Lozancic contributed greatly to the success of Operation Landward Breeze, when the HVO, with the help of the Croatian Army and in cooperation with the 5th Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, liberated a great number of towns and villages in Bosanska Krajina and inflicted great losses on the so-called army of the Serb Republic. Together with Major General Mico Lasic, he, on the basis of the plan of the Ministry of Defense of the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia, had command of the HVO troops. While the action took place, Lozancic was constantly on the front line, often issuing statements, one even to Bosnia-Herzegovina Television. It is indicative that, in these statements, he never praised the cooperation of the 5th Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the fighting on the western Bosnia-Herzegovina front. He probably thought that by mentioning Dudakovic's forces he may diminish the achievements of his own troops.

Lozancic's key political orientation is therefore no mystery, as there is no uncertainty about what he will be able to rely on in heading the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina when he is elected. However, the dilemma regarding his behavior towards the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, which, in truth, he has never accepted, remains.

Bosnian Serbs Holding Group of Sarajevo Muslims

Ministers on 'Kidnapped' People

AU0201203796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 2 Jan 96

[Report by Samir Huseinovic on news conference by Bosnian Minister Without Portfolio Hasan Muratovic and Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic in Sarajevo on 2 January — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Huseinovic] Since 22 December, Serb terrorists have kidnapped 16 people on the Hadzici-Sarajevo and Kiseljak-Sarajevo roads at Ilidza and led them to an unknown destination. This number may be even higher, and they may include disappeared people, particularly those coming from abroad whose families may still not be aware of their disappearance.

With regard to this, Minister Hasan Muratovic said the following:

[Muratovic, in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] So far we have asked IFOR [Implementation Force] several times to unconditionally liberate the kidnapped people and ensure security along the road. Among other occasions, these demands were issued at two meetings of joint commissions for implementing agreements held at Sarajevo airport, at a special meeting with the officials of the Sarajevo IFOR brigade, and in two letters, the last of which was sent today.

Before IFOR took over the mandate, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] used to form columns and provide an escort company. At that time, there were some cases of vehicles being stoned, but not of kidnapping. In our opinion, IFOR must make the roads completely free for traffic. This brings us to the conclusion that a greater level of safety is possible to expect only after all armed Serbs leave the territories that are, according to the agreement, supposed to belong to the Federation and when the federal police takes control along the roads.

We have already cautioned our citizens to no longer take the risk of traveling without an escort, and we demand that IFOR ensure road safety. This brings us back to the situation in the past with less freedom of movement, but, considering the price we have already paid, there is no other option. We think that IFOR must find a way to free the captured civilians. Our citizens must enjoy the same rights as all people in civilized societies.

[Huseinovic] One of the correspondents' questions applied to a statement IFOR Spokesman Lieutenant (Reiner) gave to Radio Free Europe according to which IFOR is not acquainted with the kidnapping of citizens, to which Minister Muratovic said the following:

[Muratovic] I told you, first, that at two meetings of the joint commission for the implementation of the agreement held at the airport, [words indistinct] it was demanded that the Serbs release the people and stop the violence on the road and that IFOR ensure security. Three days ago, I personally called [name indistinct]'s deputy to my office and there, in the presence of three more officers, informed him of this and presented him with the demand to release these people. We have sent two letters and once again [word indistinct] the full list with all 16 names. This is the truth. I do not believe that anybody in IFOR was as irresponsible as to say that we have not informed them. If we continue to talk with IFOR like that and if it continues to inform correspondents in this way, then I believe that it will be a catastrophe not only for the world public, but also for our people here.

[Huseinovic] Muhamed Sacirbegovic, foreign minister of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, addressed the correspondents because some of the aspects of the problem apply to the elements of the Dayton agreement.

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[Sacirbegovic, in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] First of all, it is IFOR's duty to ensure freedom of movement. What is involved here are not isolated incidents, but a continued terrorizing of the population, and therefore IFOR must react.

I talked about these problems with Ambassador Frowick [head of the Sarajevo mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], and he is very concerned about this situation. Prominent UN officials also expressed concern. The Serb authorities must not be allowed to impose their will. This is a transitional period, and IFOR is obliged to perform what it has taken on itself. One must not allow such a situation to be used as an excuse for Serb paramilitary formations to be given any opportunity to perform road security after the 45-day period expires.

Judging from this situation, it may be said that Sarajevo is still under siege. What is absurd is the fact that, in all this time, the international community demanded that our government provide special security measures and guarantees for the Serb population, but at the same time, nobody was threatened on the territory that is under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities. The situation now is that at least 16 people, Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens, are being detained by Karadzic's Serbs.

Serbs Admit to Holding Muslims

AU0201210096 Paris AFP in English 2045 GMT 2 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan 2 (AFP) — The Bosnian Serb authorities said Tuesday they were holding a group of Bosnian Moslems who had disappeared in a Serb-controlled neighborhood of Sarajevo, the SRNA news agency said.

But they denied allegations from the Bosnian government that they had been kidnapped, it said.

The report quoted Dragan Dragic, in charge of relations between the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), who earlier said the Serb authorities would check allegations that 16 Bosnian civilians, according to the Bosnian government, had been abducted.

Muslims Trying To 'Jeopardize' Accord

LD0201222896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2150 GMT 2 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 2 Jan (SRNA) — Dragan Dragic, the authorized representative of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic for relations with IFOR [Implementation Force], has confirmed in a statement to SRNA that a group of Muslims has been detained in Serb Sarajevo, but he rejected all the speculation about their alleged abduction.

"This group was held for questioning because, when passing through Serb Sarajevo, they turned off the road down which they were supposed to travel. Among those detained are uniformed persons and even a Muslim security officer," Dragic explained in his statement to SRNA.

He added that some of the detained persons were even driving around in military vehicles.

Dragic said responsibility for this incident lay with the Muslim authorities, and he accused them of playing games with their citizens by sending them into Serb parts of Sarajevo in order to jeopardize the implementation of the peace agreement.

He said that "the Muslims have no business in Ilidza and in other parts of Serb Sarajevo, according to the Dayton agreement, before the beginning of March, when the handover of power in this area is planned." [passage omitted]

French Officer on Abduction

BR0301134096 Paris LE FIGARO in French 3 Jan 96 p 3

[Report by Catherine Monnet: "Bosnia: Ilidza's Disappeared People"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Travelers entering Sarajevo will now have a choice of two routes. The direct path goes via Serb-controlled Ilidza. Otherwise, there is the sadly famous Mt. Igman route. The first takes just 20 minutes, while the second at least two hours. Most of the capital's inhabitants do not hesitate to choose to take the torturous Mt. Igman route. They are all afraid of being arrested and seeing their names added to the list of 18 people who have disappeared so far in Serbian territory.

The first disappearances took place on Christmas day. Yesterday, the number of missing persons was once again increased by the Bosnian authorities: Another seven civilians have gone into Ilidza and not come out.

IFOR [Implementation Force] officials remain cautious: "There is no indication that these are real disappearances, but there is no indication to the contrary, either," Lieutenant Colonel Yves Bourboulon, IFOR liaison officer, explained yesterday.

At the Ilidza checkpoint, French soldiers do not even seem to be aware of the events. Nor do Serbian soldiers. Yet the Bosnian Government has already asked IFOR three times to intervene in this matter.

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General Muratovic, Bosnian minister of relations between the Army and IFOR, has written to Admiral Leyton Smith, commander of the NATO multinational force, to ask for the "hostages" to be released.

Freedom of Movement

Many citizens of Sarajevo feel "it is up to IFOR to protect us." "No, that is not our role," Lieutenant Colonel Bourboulon said. "We have the task of setting up confidence-building measures, i.e. allowing free movement. But there is a slight difference between building confidence so that civilians can move around and escorting people by holding their hands. As things currently stand, it is a police problem, not a military problem."

Kemal Muftic, an adviser to the Bosnian president, is not interested in this distinction: "Safety is the important thing. It does not really matter where the danger comes from." He is demanding the presence of escorts on the Ilidza road. In Kemal Muftic's view, the disappearances are the result of unacceptable terrorist acts. "The Serbs," he said, "want to discourage the implementation of the Dayton agreement."

He also denounced IFOR's attitude: "This act of hostage-taking is a serious violation of the Dayton agreement," he said, stressing the need "to further explain IFOR's stance, especially in view of 20 January." That is the date for the transfer of the Sarajevo Serbian neighborhoods, first to IFOR control and then to control by the Bosnian authorities. At less than three weeks before the deadline, the disappearances are not likely to reassure the Sarajevo government.

Dzedan, a former member of the special police, knows perfectly well that he cannot venture into Ilidza. "I am a soldier and they know it." He will wait until the Serbian areas are no longer Serbian before he crosses through them. "After 20 January, then maybe I will go." Perhaps alone. After all, Dzedan is furious at IFOR, and disappointed, too. "We used to think that NATO soldiers were better than the UN soldiers, but we have seen that they conduct themselves in the same way. They are not doing anything to defend us."

Izetbegovic Vows 'Additional Efforts'

AU0301133796 Paris AFP in English 1245 GMT 3 Jan 96

[Report by Edina Neretlajk]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Jan 3 (AFP) — U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry called Wednesday for the speedy creation of an international police force here, to ease the strain on the NATO-led Bosnian peace mission in civilian areas. [passage omitted]

Perry's comments followed sharp Bosnian Government criticism of IFOR's failure to provide sufficient security to civilians crossing Serb-held areas, after Serbs on Tuesday admitted detaining 16 people.

Perry, who was speaking after meeting Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, later left the capital for the north-eastern town of Tuzla, where U.S. IFOR [Implementation Force] troops are headquartered. [passage omitted]

For his part, Izetbegovic said he and Perry had discussed the abduction issue and "measures that should be taken to solve this situation."

He vowed to take "additional efforts" to guarantee the safety of Bosnian Serbs currently living in rebel areas due to return to government control, but ruled out concessions to those suspected of war crimes.

Despite the abduction crisis, Izetbegovic said IFOR deployment was "going better than expected." [passage omitted]

Delic Sends New Year's Message to Army Members

AU2912203395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 29 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Army General Rasim Delic, commander of the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, has sent a New Year's message to our Army fighters and officers. Among other things, the message says the following:

It is our joint desire for a true peace to reign, for expellees to return to their (?homes), for the ill and wounded to recover, for [words indistinct], for the rights of the families of fallen soldiers, the war disabled and fighters [words indistinct].

On this occasion, let us remember our dear fallen soldiers, their families, and particularly [words indistinct]. Let us be with them and help them [words indistinct] and God's will. We must not forget that [word indistinct] sacrifices and the will toward liberation has given meaning to life, freedom, democracy, and [word indistinct] in general.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army supports the peace agreement and has been contributing fully to its honest implementation. Along with that, a bloody historical experience teaches us that in accordance with the new conditions, we should continue to build our Army with an equal zeal, to train it and make it ready according to the [word indistinct] of modern armies, to arm it with modern technology and weapons, it is said, among other things in the congratulations message sent by the head of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army to [words indistinct].

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Izetbegovic Criticizes New Year TV 'Celebration'

AU0201213396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 2 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Now we have the open letter written by Bosnia-Herzegovina President Alija Izetbegovic to the editors of Radio and Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina, presenting his personal view:

Gentlemen, it was with the sense of displeasure that I watched yesterday's evening television newscast showing some scenes that you said represent the way New Year was celebrated in Bosnia. I think that the vast majority of our people, and particularly the fighters, felt the same kind of sadness after that program. They wondered where they actually live, because what you presented as a popular New Year's celebration was in fact the celebration that was enjoyed by a minority, in any case not more than a thousandth part of our people. What happened with the remaining 99.9 percent of our citizens? If they celebrated New Year at all, if they had any opportunity and will to do so, they did so modestly, in a way that would not hurt the feelings of thousands of people who lost people dear to them as well as their homes.

It was only a small number of insolent and ruthless individuals who dared — while graves and wounds are still fresh — get drunk and make faces before cameras as if nothing had happened.

You, the radio and television editors, bear a part of the responsibility for that. You have shown this without any comment; it even seems with approval. We really are a European country, but that does not mean that we should keep a wide open door to all European vices — alcohol, pornography, drugs, and licentiousness of all kinds. We are going to follow European efficiency, punctuality, diligence, and sense of organization, but we shall not follow Europe and the United States in all their habits that lack judgement and measure.

I would also ask you not to impose on us some Santa Clauses and other symbols that are alien to our people. Let everybody have them at home if they wish to do so. Television is a public institution and our people is no longer a [word indistinct] that may allow itself to be made a fool of.

Of course, we do not want to resort to censorship and bans, but we are going to make sure that the people will refuse with contempt the various questionable values that there is an attempt to impose on it in the name of culture and freedom, but in fact of fake culture and freedom.

[Signed] Alija Izetbegovic.

Serbs Destroy Velez TV-Radio Transmitter

AU2912205195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 29 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The ONASA agency reports that the army of the Serb entity last night tore down the Radio and Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina transmitter on Velez Mountain. According to reports issued by the Mostar Security Services Center, explosions were heard in the region of Velez Mountain where this transmitter was located between 0200 and 0300 [0100-0200 GMT] last night. It was established today that the Velez transmitter has been destroyed. On the basis of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace agreement, this transmitter belongs to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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Serb POW's Released in Karlovac Under Amnesty

LD0201133196 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 2 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Following a decision by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman on an amnesty for a number of people, 42 prisoners of war have been released from the Karlovac district prison. They are members of former Serb paramilitary units in Croatia who were captured in the Kordun, Lika, and Banovina areas; that is, in the vicinity of Slunj, Karlovac, and Blasko, during Operation Storm.

Twenty-eight of them left for a reception center in Gasinci and then for Serbia. Fourteen decided to stay in Croatia and have already left to join their relatives and families in Rijeka, Karlovac, Zagreb, and other towns in Croatia, we have learned from the Karlovac district prison and the Karlovac military court.

We have learned from the Karlovac district prison that there were no serious problems with the pardoned persons either before or after they had been sentenced. Most of them had been sentenced to three to five years' imprisonment for committing enemy activities and acts of armed rebellion against Croatia, or proceedings had been under way against the same persons in the Karlovac military court.

Arrive at Gasinci Refugee Camp

LD0301112596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1104 GMT 3 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 3 (TANJUG)—Spokesman for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] Mans Nyberg has said that more than 300 Serbs who were pardoned after being tried for alleged armed rebellion have arrived in the refugee camp in Gasinci in eastern Croatia.

Nyberg said that 306 Serbs had arrived early on Tuesday and that 35 others were expected to arrive during the day, REUTERS reported from Zagreb on Tuesday.

Nyberg said that UNHCR officials were not allowed to talk with the Serbs, who are part of the 455 Serbs pardoned last week under a decree by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.

"We are not allowed to interview them to find out what they want to do—stay or leave," Nyberg said.

However, the Croatian Organization for Refugees and Displaced Persons, which runs the camp, has given different information. The organization's spokeswoman Ana Markus said that there were 349 Serbs in the camp, that they had arrived late on Sunday and that most of them wanted to go to Serbia.

The pardoned Serbs were arrested during and after Croatia's aggression against the Republic of Serb Krajina in August 1995.

Croatian authorities have not yet disclosed the exact number of imprisoned Serbs, but the Croatian Helsinki Human Rights Committee has estimated that there are about 1,500 of them and said that they are being tortured.

Many of them were sentenced in summary procedures in dubious trials, where as many as a dozen of Serbs were tried at once and defended by just one counsel, the committee said recently.

This is why the committee has called for a law on general amnesty, which the Croatian president promised to the Krajina Serbs during Croatia's military operation.

Representatives of Serbs in Croatia believe that there can be no mass returns of Serbs to Croatia without a law on general amnesty, which would exclude those proved to have committed war crimes.

After Croatia's aggression against southern and northern Serb Krajina in August, about 250,000 Serbs left their homes and found refuge in the neighbouring (Bosnian Serb state) Republika Srpska and Yugoslavia.

Foreign Minister Discusses Muslim-Croat Issues

LD0301110096 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 3 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, today received Dr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling, international mediator for the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. During a lengthy conversation Minister Granic informed his guest about current efforts aimed at strengthening the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina after the signing of the peace agreement.

They particularly discussed the forthcoming first session of the joint council for top-level cooperation between the Republic of Croatia and the Federation and Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The international mediator said that he is very pleased with the council becoming operational and informed Minister Granic about his impressions after visiting Tuzla and central Bosnia. He emphasized the need to establish civilian traffic between Bosnian Posavina and Tuzla and enable the return of the population to Bugojno, Jajce, and to other towns in line with the Dayton agreement.

Minister Granic told Dr. Schilling about the main topics of the first session of the council. In his opinion, it will mark the beginning of a very important process in which political, economic, and strategic interests must

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be coordinated, above all by setting up the federal government as soon as possible, strengthening economic cooperation between the federation and Croatia, setting up the municipal and cantonal authorities, and solving humanitarian issues.

The successful repatriation of refugees from Velika Kladusa was also discussed. Minister Granic and Dr. Schilling said that over 50 percent of the refugees from the Kuplensko camp have returned to their homes as a result of the tripartite cooperation between police forces from Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Turkey.

Interim Administration for E. Slavonia Formed

LD2912181295 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 29 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At a session today, chaired by [Prime Minister] Zlatko Matesa, the government of the Republic of Croatia decided to set up the office of the interim administration for the establishment of Croatian authority in the area of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Srjem, in line with the implementation of the Erdut and Dayton agreements.

Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Kostovic has been appointed the government's representative at the interim administration. Ivica Vrkic has been appointed the head of the office and deputy government representative at the interim administration. Mato Simic has been appointed representative of refugees in the interim administration. Members of the office are Beli Mayor Manastir Marko Kvesic and Vukovar Mayor Jure Kolak.

FRY Interpretation of Normalization Reviewed

AU3012162795 Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 25 Dec 95 p 21

[Commentary by Jozo Curic: "Undercover Yugoslavia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An evil spirit is rising from papers still warm from the accord. At the other side of the Drina and the Danube interpreters of the Basic Agreement [on Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem] and the Paris documents are making themselves heard and being followed by like-minded people in Croatia and the world. This is no longer the usual prattle about a new Yugoslav community. This time, the evil spirit is trying to hide under the guise of the "new European order," economic cooperation in southeastern Europe, defeat of nationalism and national leaders, that is, the new ideology of the Yugoslav Left. The foundation is no longer "the impossibility of solving the crisis except through a new Yugoslavia" (F. Lewis). What we are in fact getting from Belgrade is a special interpretation of "normalization" which resembles the Memorandum [document on Serbia's status written by members of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences].

The people of Mirjana Markovic (the first political lady of Serbia, president of the JUL [Yugoslav United Left], and Milosevic's wife) recently boasted that they have their people throughout Croatia who, what a pity, "are forced to work covertly."

The insufficiently quick implementation of the Basic Agreement on the region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem, which should be partly attributed to the incapability of the UN and its secretary general, and partly to independent interpretations of the text in Belgrade, Erdut, and Vukovar, is proof that many political centers of power do not want to willingly let Croatia leave the clutch of blackmail, pressures, and new Yugoslavism. When interpreting the new historical circumstances, some powerful forces in Serbia are seeing an opportunity to realize the goals they have against Croatia, all under the guise of an all-desired normalization as a prerequisite of the new European order. Elements of that guise are the demands for some sections of the Croatian state territory which they would no longer occupy but exchange, then demands for return to Croatia by Serbs who took part in armed actions against Croats, demands for a special status of the region of the Croatian Podunavlje [the Danube river valley], mentioning the Serb population's century-old rights, equaling aggressor with his victim, and belittling state borders in comparison with general European economic cooperation and the global socialist solidarity.

"Future" According to Milosevic's Wife

The instruments that Milosevic has found with the help of his wife are the constant mentioning of peace; settling accounts with the radicals; making pacts with great powers and perhaps NATO; avoiding international questioning on democracy in Serbia, on media freedom, and the respect of minority and human rights of the Croats, Hungarians, and Albanians; achieving international recognition for Serbia automatically and through a side door, "Partnership for Peace"....

Thus, the president of the JUL directorate told POLITIKA that the "FRY will have to link up with all countries that were created around it on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.... The process of linking people, all people living there, is necessary not only on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, but also on the territory of the entire Balkan peninsula.... The future of everybody living in the Balkans is the association of the peoples .... confederation, union, or something third," Milosevic's wife said and added that such an association is "the condition for peace, successful and free develop-

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ment." According to her, the Balkans include Slovenia as well and the solution means "occupation through peace" and not war. It is easy to see from the reaction of the Vukovar yes-men what that Serb peace would look like, within some kind of confederation with Serbia, with flimsy borders, free circulation of commodities and population. Under the word of "normalization," the united leftist Serbs are offering us quick forgiveness, brotherhood, and unity.....

Dumping Into Balkans

Serbia's task would be to help reconstruction of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and their return into socialism, the more-or-less reformed communism. Is this the reason for Markovic's undercover agents to be in Croatia? Does Markovic's "peace" in fact mean creating socialist atmosphere for the Russia-type chaos and is the liquidation of nationalism heralded by international Serbian socialism that has long been seeking like-minded people in Croatia? One thing is certain—many people in the West tend to dump Croatia into the Balkans in a similar way, and not one of them would be crying if they got a neocommunist solution to this Russia-type of chaos with as little money and obligation as possible.

The problem is also being presented to us as the problem of succession, the question of whether NATO will ever leave Bosnia, or as the opening of the possibility of a new cold peace which would have a negative impact on the Croatian idea of the value of independence. There are many reasons for Croatia to hurry normalization, recognition of borders, and reintegration of eastern Croatia in Bonn, and Belgrade forecasts and expects many advantages that it hopes to gain from the "hard" stand. This is why now staying in the game are criminals who will try to belittle the still hot texts of the accords or gain for Belgrade at least Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is enticed from Belgrade as a reserve possibility (open offers to Sarajevo—resumption of communications, recognition, exchange of ambassadors, establishing joint chamber of economy, customs union....), or as a beginning or substitute for Yugoslavia.

Opposition Coalition in Zagreb Challenges HDZ

LD2912212695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2049 GMT 29 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Dec. 29 (TANJUG)—A coalition of Croatian opposition parties, which won 65 percent of the vote in the elections for the city assembly, has warned the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) that it will not give up the office of city mayor and that it will take over authority in the city in line with the voters' decision.

Opposition parties' leaders informed about it HDZ officials in the latest round of talks on Friday, stressing that they would let HDZ officials have only those offices they are entitled to according to the election returns.

The HDZ attempts to persuade some of the major opposition parties to jointly set up the city government have failed.

A decision by the Croatian Constitutional Court that confirmed the Croatian Government decision to annul a constituent assembly of the city of Zagreb and, consequently, appointment of mayor among opposition candidates is, according to the opposition, a political and not a legal move.

The opposition has announced that it will respect decisions by the Constitutional Court and that on Jan. 2 it will attend a new constituent assembly, stressing that it will again vote an opposition candidate mayor.

If HDZ officials again fail to attend the constituent assembly, making it impossible to adopt valid decisions, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman might appoint city commissioner.

In that case, new elections for the city assembly woud have to be called within two months, opposition officials say adding that in new elections they could even win a more convincing majority.

Cervenko Discusses Military Reorganization

AU0201133295 Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 25 Dec 95 pp 18-20

[Interview with General Zvonimir Cervenko, chief of the Croatian Army General Staff, by Boris Komadina; place and date not given: "'Mill'—the Exercise for Eastern Slavonia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The 68-year-old Zvonimir Cervenko, the chief of the General Staff of the Croatian Army, is a man with a turbulent past who can genuinely claim to have a Hollywood biography. After a successful military career in the former Yugoslav People's Army, the top man of the Croatian Army was arrested in January 1972 and sentenced to a year and a half in prison as a Croatian nationalist according to a 14-page indictment. Released from prison, he worked as a television debt collector for 15 years! When the democratic changes came, he re-entered the army and received a senior position. From "the hot seat" as top man in the Croatian Army, Cervenko summarizes the last year for HRVATSKI OBZOR, certainly the Croatian Army's most successful one. [passage omitted]

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[Komadina] The tactical exercise "Mill" [Mlinac] is not very well known....

[Cervenko] The function of "Mill" was to prepare the military liberation of eastern Slavonia. It was a tactical exercise aimed at reaching the river. We also had a large number of training activities for the General Staff in which single commands coordinated their interactions in minute detail. The Croatian Army finally disposed of stereotypes inherited from the past, the formal and bureaucratic approach. This has been proven by the successes in operations since "Storm." These operations were, in terms of the number of units, on a smaller scale, but were very successful. We took Mala Manjaca and came as close as 23 km to Banja Luka. This created a strategic balance that later made the Dayton agreement possible, which opened the way for Croatian diplomacy.

[Komadina] Would it have been possible to take Banja Luka?

[Cervenko] Had we been given the order, we would have certainly carried it out. When we got within 23 km of Banja Luka and were able to put Prijedor, Banja Luka, and other places under artillery control, the Serbs immediately stopped targeting Slavonia and their supremacy was ended.

[Komadina] Are the local Serbs a real military power?

[Cervenko] The 11th corps of the local Serbs, which is stationed in the occupied area of eastern Slavonia, is no great problem for us. We must be aware, however, that the Yugoslav Army is in the area with units from Kragujevac, Nis, Cuprija, etc. The so-called 12th Corps of the "Yugoslav" [quotation marks as published] army, which is based in Vojvodina, has deployed considerable forces on the left bank of the Danube. In other words, the army of local Serbs is part of the "Yugoslav" army. We know, however, what they have there and there is no reason for fear.

[Komadina] A reorganization of the Croatian Army and its transformation from a war concept to one for peacetime has been announced. What does this actually entail?

[Cervenko] The press has written so much about this topic that I have the impression that journalists know more about it than I do. The current organization of the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian Army General Staff has developed according to our needs over the last four years. Today, when almost the whole of the national territory has been liberated and it seems that the final solution to eastern Slavonia will be sought in a diplomatic way, we can finally reorganize the internal structure of the Croatian defense system. There is nothing strange about this. An army waging a war has to undergo a change, a transformation, in the sense of reduction and modernization. In other words, we shall do everything that could not be done during the war. Apart from that, we shall sooner or later become a part of the European defense system, so we have to adapt our defense system to that.

The degree of compatibility has already been set. We know exactly what our aims must be. A number of NATO publications always mention the following characteristics: the interoperability and congruence of doctrines and procedures must be further developed, including the compatibility of the main combat systems, identical ammunition and other combat means, the possibility of integrating troops into joint units, the applicability of identical safety regulations and measures, and, finally, the adoption of standards and norms already coordinated. This is a huge task.

We shall have to sign and implement over 1,200 agreements and statutes of various kinds, which are more or less the precondition for any kind of cooperation. In other words, we have to change many things to be able to join this alliance.

We have developed a model for a military force that will be optimal for performance of present and future tasks and implementation of strategic ideas. It foresees the development of an army that will in the long run contribute to the stability in the region. Military force should be used for carrying out efficient actions aimed at launching sudden strong attacks on the enemy, destroy his defense system and disperse his units. Therefore, our strategic organization plays a very important role.

We also have to reorganize the General Staff of the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defense Ministry. The size of the army must be reduced and its efficiency enhanced. I think that this can be achieved relatively quickly.

[Komadina] When can it be expected?

[Cervenko] This is a complex task and requires time. In addition, the transformation of the army is an ongoing process. Therefore I cannot tell you that the reorganization will be completed by June 1996, for example; we cannot stop then and wait another 10 years to make the next reorganization.

[Komadina] Does the reorganization also include separation of the General Staff from the Defense Ministry?

[Cervenko] The General Staff is within the Defense Ministry. The possibility of the General Staff being physically separated is good because we simply do not have enough room. This does not mean anything.

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however. It is very well known what is under the General Staff's jurisdiction and its role toward the Defense Ministry. This corresponds to the democratic, parliamentary organization and these things are quite normal in Western democracies. We shall certainly be adapting the structure of the General Staff within the Defense Ministry and the Croatian Army to such a system.

[Komadina] It has been announced that certain regional commands will be abolished, divisions created, etc.

[Cervenko] I do not know from where you have this information. There is a theoretical proposal on which we are working now. It is not necessary to make a public fuss about it. It is only natural for an army to make changes when it changes over from a war to a peacetime organization. You must realize that approximately 340,000 people have served with the Croatian Army during this war. We do not need such an army in peacetime. One of the tasks of the reorganization is to define the number of troops in wartime and in peacetime. These are, for example, two things that we have to do within this "magical reorganization." We have to define units and regions, and which weapons we need and in what quantities, etc.

We have already done very much on this aspect of reorganization. After "Storm," we immediately demobilized 100,000 troops. By Christmas we will have demobilized another 42,000 in line with the president's decision, and we shall continue demobilizations during the Christmas season. It is important to stress that we are carrying out the whole reorganization ourselves.

[Komadina] Personnel changes are the most interesting part of the announced reorganization. It is being said in the press that many high-ranking officers will be pensioned off and your name is being mentioned in that context, too.

[Cervenko] I would say that this, too, is normal. There will be personnel changes and this should not be surprising. Especially so because those who have proven themselves capable and creative in this war must be appointed to responsible positions.

As for my retirement, I shall resign as chief of the General Staff when the commander in chief of the army makes such a decision. As a high-ranking Croatian Army officer, I always carry out orders from the commander of the army. This is also what I require from my subordinates.

[Komadina] Some high-ranking officers have been replaced or suspended, such as General Vrbanac and Brigadier General Borkovic.

[Cervenko] I shall be open with you. Gen. Vrbanac made a mistake. He was suspended from duty and court martialled. The court decided not to promote him. All the other stories are merely rumors.

He made moves on his own that he should not have done and this had consequences.

[Komadina] The removal of the arms embargo has been announced. How will the Croatian Army prepare itself for this?

[Cervenko] The removal of the embargo will enable us to create an army according to our needs. We have developed Croatian arms production in this war and have manufactured many things ourselves. The removal of the embargo will enable us to buy the weapons that we are unable to manufacture ourselves. You must realize that our weapons are old-fashioned and, apart from that, our reserves are not great enough because of the four-year war. I think that we shall equip the Croatian Army with the most modern weapons within a short time.

[Komadina] What will the priorities be?

[Cervenko] Modern antiaircraft weapons, aircraft, and command and information systems. Unfortunately, some newspapers publish exaggerations that have no real basis, such as the acquisition of 100 F-16 aircraft. I must tell you that we do not want to buy only aircraft. The accompanying weapons, as well as servicing facilities where these weapons would be maintained, may cost twice as much as the aircraft. But things are claimed by people who know very little or nothing about the army. We do not want to become a superpower, but we simply need a powerful, well-equipped, and efficient army that corresponds to our needs. The size of the Croatian Army in peacetime will certainly not exceed 1.5 percent of its population.

[Komadina] The international community requires "a balance of military force" between the states of former Yugoslavia. Does this mean that Croatia will have to reduce its military strength?

[Cervenko] The criteria and norms will be defined by the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]. We are within these limits. We shall certainly not be reducing our military strength.

Budget To Cut Defense Spending by 15 Percent

LD0201193596 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 2 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Croatia has an interim budget for January 1996. The government has just put the finishing touches to the draft budget for 1996. The

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main change is a reduction in the defense budget, and significantly greater resources are being earmarked for reconstruction and infrastructure development.

The government is still working on details of the 1996 draft budget. According to information obtained so far, the new budget should be about 10 percent up on last year's budget. The figure of 35.5 billion kuna is being mentioned, a figure that includes debts. An important new feature of the budget is its structure.

[Begin Finance Minister Bozo Prka recording] Government policy is reflected in the following—defense spending is being reduced by 15 percent compared to 1995. Expenditure on displaced persons and refugees, in keeping with reconstruction policy, is to be reduced by 33 percent.

Government policy can best be seen from the following: Funds available for reconstruction are going up 162 percent on last year's figure. The sum available for reconstruction is to be 1.6 billion kuna. Resources available for road building are going up 100 percent, which will ensure that about 1 billion kuna is earmarked for new roads. Resources for pension funds, in other words for social welfare purposes, are going up 152 percent, and this year the pension fund will be better off to the tune of 1.1 billion kuna. [passage omitted] [end recording]

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Gligorov Promises To Continue on 'European Road'

AU0301143396 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 30-31 Dec 95 , 1-2 Jan 96 pp 1, 20

[New Year's statement by President Kiro Gligorov; place and date not given: "Macedonia Will Continue the European Road"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the occasion of the new year and the Christmas holidays, Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov made a New Year's statement. In his statement, in which he offers the citizens best wishes for the forthcoming holidays, the president says:

"We will definitely remember 1995 as the year in which the international position of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] was strengthened. We needed a five-year struggle for Macedonia's so-called European orientation. We were faced with many obstacles with which we are very familiar, but at last, besides our previous admission into the United Nations, Macedonia was also admitted into the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and 'Partnership for Peace,' by which the security and safety of the Republic of Macedonia has been increased.

"The democratic processes and everything that Macedonia is gradually showing and constructing as a foundation for a legal state and civil society is being continued. I here include the positive processes that have been carried out in the last year in the field of interethnic relations with our permanent insistence on solving all interethnic relations within the institutions, within the framework of the Constitution and the laws, and with the aim of gradually creating an atmosphere of confidence, mutual understanding, and coexistence.

"This year was also characterized by large economic and social tensions. This is understandable, considering the duration of the war and everything else that happened in the region after closing the borders, which made transport and communications much more difficult than in previous years. All this created an ambience and feeling in Macedonia that the years are passing and that we are still faced with great economic troubles, particularly in production, exports, and the balance of payments.

"If we summarize all the results, we can say that last year, for the Macedonian state, nation, and all its citizens, meant greater international presence, intensification of security, and expansion of Macedonia's recognition as a state by a large number of countries whom many recognized under its constitutional name.

"The difficulties in the economic problems, which create problems in the normal lives of families, of the families of all our citizens, are, first of all, a result of the war, of the southern neighbor's embargo that was in force until only recently, and of all the other economic difficulties that were, first of all, caused by the interruption of the traditional links, traditional markets, and everything that was ruling Macedonia in the last 45 to 50 years.

"Next year we must, first of all, focus on internal problems, the economy, the standard of living, the social situation of all our citizens, the further development of a state governed by laws and the civil society by getting the citizens more actively involved in all the political and other processes that will define the future of the country. I believe this is a priority task.

"Regarding our foreign plan, we will continue with the hitherto efforts that made Macedonia a largely spoken-of state that has been made renown as never before, and we will continue on the same road that we have been on the last five years, which means that Macedonia will be the architect of peace and stability in this region of the Balkans, we will continue the policy of peace, cooperation with all the neighbors and European states. We will continue the orientation for agreements in the next year, as soon as possible, with the European Union, as well as with the Western European Union, that is the military part of the European Union, including other organizations in which we have or are waiting to be admitted. I here refer to organizations like the World Trading Organization, which has replaced GATT, and which is of great importance for Macedonia's normal incorporation in the world's economic processes. It will thus not be discriminated on the world's markets and it will have equal conditions, as well as preferential conditions for trade and cooperation wherever possible.

"Basically, we have a lot of work ahead of us. This may be the most difficult part in constructing a new state, which had to establish its international status before embarking on its own social structure as a modern state governed by laws and economic prosperity. This period requires the help of all citizens, regardless of religion, nationality, culture, etc. I deeply believe that, besides what we have achieved internationally, our social structure is of even greater interest for each citizen, because it is the hope for every citizen that his family and he himself will feel a part of their own state and will take the responsibility for its future....

"Considering this to be the basic message, I would like to wish a Merry Christmas to all those who celebrate it, and a Happy New Year to all the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, with the desire to maintain coexistence and tranquility, despite all the unpleasant events, as was the attempt on my life that failed.

"In wishing you a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year, I promise that Macedonia will continue on the same road which has been sufficiently checked and prosperous, which is sufficiently present in the general and objective trends that govern the European

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society and the world, and which can only bring peace, prosperity, and a better future to Macedonia.

"Thank you."

Feeling 'Well,' To Resume Work

LD0201180596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1759 GMT 2 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, Jan. 2 (TANJUG)—President of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] Kiro Gligorov said on Tuesday that he would return to his duties after the new year holidays.

In a new year's address to the nation, Gligorov said FYROM would pursue the policy of peace that had made the state a factor of stability in the Balkans, leading it into nearly all world organizations.

In the address, broadcast on television, Gligorov said his health was well and added he felt better every day.

Gligorov was seriously injured in an assassination attempt in Skopje on Oct. 3 when a car bomb exploded near his vehicle, killing the president's driver.

The would-be-assassins have not been caught.

Poll Views Quality of Life, 'Personality' of 1995

AU2912183895

[Report by Olgica Markovska, Pandorka Davceva, Ninoslava Sazdovska, Vladimir Sidorovski, and Vladimir Jovanovski: "Gligorov Without Competition"]

[FBIS Editorial Report] Skopje PULS in Macedonian on 29 December on pages 20 and 21 carries a 1,500-report on events in the country in 1995.

The reports says that the telephone poll, which PULS organized, shows that "the president of the state was the number one personality of the past year, that last year was difficult, and that the coming year will not be any easier."

What marked the year that is passing?	
Assassination attempt against President Gligorov	57%
Economic problems (and reforms)	13%
Accord with Greece	8%
Sanctions against Serbia	3%
Crisis in ruling coalition	8%
Other	7%
Do not know	4%

What was life like in 1995?	
Bearable	42%
Better than last year	11%
Very good	3%
Difficult	41%
Do not know	3%

What will life be like next year?	
More difficult	41%
Better	35%
As before	14%
Do not know	10%

What do you fear most in the future?	
Spread of war	22%
Deterioration of interethnic relations	23%
Economic crisis	45%
Political crisis	4%
Other	4%
Do not know	2%

Which personality marked 1995?	
K. Gligorov [president]	41%
B. Crvenkovski [prime minister]	3%
M. Mancevski [movie director]	3%
Lj. Frckovski [interior minister]	2%
S. Andov [assembly chairman]	2%
Others	7%
Nobody	3%
Do not know	39%

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President Aleksander Kwasniewski Interviewed

WS0301122596 Poznan GLOS WIELKOPOLSKI in Polish 20 Dec 95 p 3

[Interview with Polish President Elect Aleksander Kwasniewski by Wlodzimierz Braniecki; place and date not given: "Poland To Be in the First League in the Year 2000"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Braniecki] During the meeting at GLOS WIELKOPOLSKI on 15 October, you said that, if you won the presidential elections, you would try to implement a policy of reconciliation and to seek solutions to many hardships, rather than pursuing conflict. At present, Polish society is clearly split almost in half. Your proponents have approved of the election of Aleksander Kwasniewski for president with satisfaction. What are you going to propose to those, however, who consider this choice as their defeat?

[Kwasniewski] We are building democracy in Poland, and this means that the subsequent—presidential, parliamentary, self-government—elections are ahead of us. Democracy means that a choice is made not by tossing a coin or by a secret arrangement or a configuration of the stars in the sky, but as a result of decisions made by a majority of voters. Some politicians in Poland seem to forget this fundamental principle; they do not want to acknowledge their defeat, and they are trying to transfer their emotions to different milieux. This minority surely has the right to express its discontent; it may voice its opinions and express regret. This is all right as long as it is in keeping with the binding law. That is how, fortunately, it has been so far. If, however, somebody who did not accept the election outcome wanted to break the law and prove that democracy exists only when he is the winner, we should defend ourselves against such methods—to defend not the president but democracy.

[Braniecki] We are building this democracy...

[Kwasniewski] Poland lacks a sufficiently shaped party system; our political stage, especially on its right side, is still dispersed. I hope it will change because a well-governed country always profits from a proper party system in which the opposition is not only contesting but also resolving fundamental problems. It is the more obvious that the roles can be reversed and the opposition can be part of the ruling coalition.

For my part, there is no threat to democracy. After these elections, Poland can go on following the path of democracy with President Kwasniewski, strengthening self-government, heading toward taking a firm place in European structures. Poland has a majority of reasonable people seeking to live in a normal, predictable country that focuses on real problems. Hence, I believe that, in the months and years to come, Poland will be heading toward a truly democratic state of law, where respect for all of its citizens as well as state institutions, the president, and the law will be in force. I will do my best to support such aspirations, in compliance with the powers vested in the president of the Polish Republic by the constitution.

From the very beginning, my presidency is marked by an aura of specific tensions and emotions, for which, in part, through neglect and mistakes, I am myself responsible. Honestly speaking, I blame myself for it. I am certain that the emotions will gradually fade away, while the tendencies to joint cooperation in solving many serious problems that we will have to deal with in the future will become stronger and stronger.

I realize the great responsibility that rests on me. I also am aware of how complex are the processes now in motion in all areas of political, social, and economic life in Poland. In the coming years, these processes will become more and more complex. To solve them efficiently one needs to seek compromises, ease tensions, and create a climate of public peace. For my part, I will work firmly to implement a democratic state of law that will unconditionally respect human rights and will have minimal intervention by state structures in the area of citizens' individual freedom.

[Braniecki Then, what is your response to the question about hopes and anxieties related to your presidency?

[Kwasniewski] As a matter of fact, your question refers directly to how mature democracy is in Poland and how to use democratic rules, in keeping with the primary interests of the state and society. In a democratic state, one needs to have an equilibrium of political forces, seek compromises wherever reasonable needs arise. This sets tasks not only for the people who rule but also for those groups that, for a time, are in opposition. In mature democracies, it is so obvious that no one even attempts to debate the issue. My observations show that the Polish people have grown up a lot in their comprehension of democracy and that they are even closer to democracy than a significant part of the political elites. The most recent elections have fully confirmed that; there was a remarkable increase in the turnout, and defeat of exotic, immature or aggressive candidates. It is true that a clear-cut polarization of voters' stands took place, but this is a help for democracy, not an obstacle. In France or the United States, it bothers nobody. That is why I think that the elections and the accompanying events (often unreasonable and reaching far beyond political norms) will not cause broader social unrest. This would be possible as a result of economic failures, unemployment,

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regional dramas, and not as a result of the election outcome. Thus, I am convinced that we can efficiently solve the problems of fundamental significance to the state, and they are plenty....

[Braniecki] Which, in your opinion, is the most crucial problem for Poland now?

[Kwasniewski] I defined these priorities in my election program. I still stick to them. I am convinced they are not only right but also possible to implement. Among such priorities, I consider important the building of a democratic state of law with a modern constitution, guaranteed civic freedoms, and a good and efficient legal system. The next task is to maintain the economic development rate. Without it, one cannot cope with unemployment and areas of poverty, develop science and culture, and ensure fair living conditions to those who are not professionally active any longer. The third problem is the forming of a citizens' state with broad self-government—that is, decentralization of power. Finally, the fourth task: Poland's entry into united Europe's economic and military structures, which means the development of good relations with all of our neighbors.

[Braniecki] Sejm Deputy Speaker Mr. Aleksander Malachowski, in a recent radio broadcast, distanced himself from the present fierce political fighting, saying that the fundamental issues to be solved in Poland today are to eradicate the problems of famished children, housing shortages, and other Polish miseries. How do you want to respond to these challenges from Poland's poor?

[Kwasniewski] I recognize that the strategic goal of my presidency is to maintain the pace of economic growth. Without it, we will not be able to resolve such crucial problems as unemployment and diminishing the areas of poverty; we seek to carry out an active social policy, social benefits reform, health service, and so forth. One surely cannot increase economic efficiency without sorting out and stabilizing the legal system. This is, however, a very complex process, and it must make allowances for the interests of various groups, including those of investors, employers, and trade unions. It is not easy to reach compromises on those issues. This is a task for the government, but as president I will support all actions zeroing in on setting broadly understood socioeconomic issues in order. During the election campaign, I stressed clearly that the efficiency of our actions would be better if the president, the prime minister, and the parliamentary majority had the same program and the same goals to reach.

Never did I promise in my campaign that I would "arrange" apartments for all young people and give jobs to the unemployed. I was being honest; no president will solve important social problems with a magic wand. It is important, however, that the president be able to determine these problems precisely and contribute to their gradual and consequent solving within his own—not so small —constitutional powers. When I talked about unemployment and housing needs, I implied that the only way to tackle those issues was to maintain the pace of economic development and to ensure for Poles broader access to the resulting material profits. The state maintains a fairer distribution of costs within the framework of the transformation. Within the framework of such a distribution, one needs to take into account the preferences for the construction sector, including those for building tenement houses, as well as to encourage creating new jobs with a proper tax system. Attributing to me promises I never made is a subtle and sometimes primitive way of misleading the Polish people.

[Braniecki] Poznan is a metropolis of Western Poland. The entry into European structures, the EU and NATO, are of crucial significance here. What guarantees are you going to give that the process of building Poland's security will not be hampered?

[Kwasniewski] I hope that in the coming five years of my presidency it will be possible to implement the Polish foreign policy guidelines on our country's access to the united structures of West Europe—the EU and NATO. Running for the post of president of the Polish Republic, I formed clear opinions on these issues. Now I explicitly repeat: This is the strategic goal of my presidency.

I believe there are some fundamental reasons for which Poland's presence in the economic and military institutions of the West is absolutely necessary.

[Braniecki] What are these reasons, most of all?

[Kwasniewski] First, there are historical reasons related to our heritage. The postwar weakening of those relations was caused by the world's political splitting into two opposite camps. Through the entry into the Western structures, our country will return to its previous international surroundings.

Second, integration into the EU is necessary for Poland because of the demands and conditions of economic development. It will be easier for Poland to come through the period of economic transformation and come closer to the leading nations of the contemporary world in an integrated Europe. The diminishing and prospective liquidation of the civilization gap that separates Poland from the developed countries seems to be the most important task and, at the same time, the challenge for decades to come.

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Third, we are seeking participation in NATO to strengthen our external security. This is especially important, as history has shown, because of the geopolitical situation of Poland. Although nothing poses a direct threat to Poland now, too many dramas are taking place not far from the Polish borders to ignore them. Nowadays, NATO is the most powerful military structure in the world, and there is no way not to take it into consideration.

Fourth, Poland's association with European institutions may and should be a boost to the democratic changes taking place in Poland. Running for a place in the EU and NATO, we should adapt to the high democratic standards and norms that are in force there. In applying for participation in the European structures, we do not have an inferiority complex, expecting much and offering nothing in return.

[Braniecki] Yes, but so far Poland's entry into European structures has not been a smooth process....

[Kwasniewski] I realize that there have been and there will be different interests of the countries in our region. We must consider this the same way our partners must consider Poland's interests. If we want to maintain stability in Europe and strengthen other nations' sense of security, a consensus is necessary to make allowances for various viewpoints and different interests.

The process of Poland's full integration with the western part of our continent is going to be hard and complex. We must prepare for it well, most of all—I have no doubts about it—we must be politically stable, economically developed, attractive to the world. We must also have the best relations possible with specific partners in the West and, at the same time, cherish good relations with our neighbors in the East—Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania. We Poles are expected to be a stabilizing factor, not causes of tension in Europe. We cannot ignore the fact that Russia occupies a significant place in Western politicians' thinking. No wonder—it is, after all, a nation of 150 million people, with great natural resources and the manufacturing potential to be developed... and with the atom bomb. Russia has no right to veto Poland's or any country's access to NATO. Poland's intentions are not of an anti-Russian character; Poland's participation in such European structures is not directed against Russia.

For the whole course of actions on Poland's entry into NATO and the EU, it is especially important to have a consensus from all political forces in Poland. There are comprehensive differences in the views of political groups on particular matters, but no one questions these priorities of Poland's foreign policy.

The recent expression of a too declarative position by our West European partners and the United States in this matter is what causes anxiety. I do realize that we have to deal with a very difficult problem with various implications—the question referring not only to Poland but also to other Central European countries. It is not good, however, when the door to the Western structures is opening too slowly, not leading even to the parlor.

[Braniecki] What are the real presidential powers? Do they meet the present social expectations?

[Kwasniewski] In Poland the president should be an equilibrium factor, easing tensions and seeking efficient solutions—especially in crisis situations. This is the way the draft project on the new constitution provides for the position of the office of president. In a nutshell: It is to be a presidency of the "center"—that is, not so strong as that of America or Russia, nor as weak as that of Germany, the Czech Republic, or Hungary. Poland cannot have a very strong presidency due to the lack of democratic experience in our country. It also refers to maintaining the proper balance between legislative, executive, and judicial powers. A strong president would have too much power and might perform his duties largely ignoring public opinion or the parliamentary system. Neither can we adopt the parliamentary-cabinet system in Poland because this option requires that a factor stabilizing the political stage be clearly shaped political parties. The Polish president of the "center" should have the possibility of efficient action, including the right to form his own cabinet in a situation when the formation of a parliamentary majority is impossible. He also should have the right of legislative initiative, veto powers, and the possibility of appealing bills to the Constitutional Tribunal.

[Braniecki] What will Poland be like in 2000—that is, Poland after a five-year presidential term?

[Kwasniewski] Poland will exist as we jointly make it. Poland should be tailored to the standards of our dreams according to its existing potential. I would like it to be beautiful, young, and rich. It is important that in 2000 we should be in the first league rather than among the weaker teams of our continent. I hope that our country will attain such a degree of economic development that it will be possible to curb unemployment, diminish areas of poverty, shape prospects for young people, and ensure fair living conditions for the elderly.

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Oleksy on Ministerial Appointment, Spying Charges

WS0301124196 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 3 Jan 96 p 2

[Report by "WZ": "Prime Minister Oleksy for Polish Radio; I Want the Issue Explained"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Below are fragments of an interview given on 2 January by Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy for "Signals of the Day" broadcast by the First Program of Polish Radio.*

["Signals of the Day"] Mr. Prime Minister, the government began the new year without a defense minister.

[Oleksy] The defense minister will be appointed by the end of the week. I have settled with the president that we should learn the name on 4 or 5 January.

["Signals of the Day"] The 2 January papers said that Oleksy already has his henchman at the Ministry of Internal Affairs—Andrzej Anklewicz. Whose henchman will the defense minister be?

[Oleksy] The papers like to look for various innuendoes. There is no such thing as Oleksy's henchman or henchmen. I have always been strongly against that. I am an advocate of a civil service that would be involved in politics to the least possible extent. But the papers play according to their own rules. There will be no henchman at the Ministry of National Defense. (...)

["Signals of the Day"] Will we learn the name of that minister?

[Oleksy] It might be Mister Dobrzanski. I do wish to say, however, that until final decisions are made corrections are still possible. (...)

["Signals of the Day"] We will not avoid the issue of the charges that have been brought against you and that continue to be at the focal point of public attention.

Today's papers report that a member of the special Sejm commission, Mister Bogdan Borusewicz, maintained regular contacts with a Stasi agent. How would you comment on that?

[Oleksy] I do not wish to comment on that at all. The reports just appeared today and speak about a member of a special commission. I am to meet with that commission; therefore, I will leave the issue aside until then.

I can, however, talk about another reoccurring topic, namely the question of whether I should suspend my duties as prime minister (until charges of maintaining contacts with the KGB are cleared—WZ). All I can do is appeal for objectivity on both sides. Suspending my duties as prime minister would imply that I admit I am at fault, and I will definitely not allow that.

One more thing. Does the presence of the prime minister pose a threat to objectivity? It has been said that a prime minister who continues to perform his duties when investigations are carried out against him can exert pressure and manipulate the secret services. My answer is that inasmuch as the prime minister did not have any influence whatsoever on the secret services that unleashed such aggression, he cannot pose a threat to objectivity as further charges are being formulated. A lot of biased opinions and philosophical and moralizing statements are being issued. I do not want to yield to that. I wish to stress one more time that I want to have the whole affair explained soon. Not only I, Jozef Oleksy, need this, but Poland needs it because harm has been done to Poland.

That is why there can be no doubt that I will try to have the affair explained soon, but thoroughly explained. I want to explain how a plot like this could have been staged in a modern state with a population of 40 million at the close of the 20th century. (...)

["Signals of the Day"] Do you think the commission will reach any definite conclusions?

[Oleksy] I do not know. I trust the parliamentary commission will make every effort to deal efficiently with this difficult situation. (...)

'Harm Done to Poland'

LD0301123196 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1105 GMT 3 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The prime minister did not want to comment on Interior Minister Jerzy Konieczny's statement. He is worried about the entire ugly matter, as he described it, not only for personal reasons but also from Poland's point of view, its interests, image, and position: Someone's reasoning was very primitive; he did not think about the fact that, apart from revenge, there are also other issues—the country, its achievements, and concern about its image.

[Begin Oleksy recording] The frequent comments by any foreign centers assessing Poland, Polish politicians, and the internal situation are not a good thing for Poland at all. [end recording]

The prime minister added that all that could be contained in a definition: Harm done to Poland. This was the reply by the head of the government to a question of whether the recent behavior of the KGB, news conferences by former agents, constituted interference in Poland's internal affairs.

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Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati, when asked what impact the entire matter would have on Poland's image in the world, said that it certainly would not be helpful. However, he also said that this was not damage that could not be repaired. According to the minister, the way in which the problem should be resolved is very important, also whether it will be possible to convince everyone that we apply procedures accepted in democratic countries.

No Comment on Koniecny Statement

LD0301103896 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 1000 GMT 3 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Minister of Internal Affairs Jerzy Koniecny thinks that the filing with the Prosecutor's Office of the motion concerning Prime Minister Oleksy's alleged collaboration with a foreign intelligence service was, to say the least, premature. The minister said that, contrary to earlier reports, there had been no operational investigation into Oleksy's alleged spying activities. The materials had been collected by a different method.

Jozef Oleksy did not want to comment on Minister Konieczny's statement. He said that, during the leave he intended to take, Deputy Prime Minister Aleksander Luczak would be deputizing for him.

Oleksy said that at today's meeting the government would discuss the schedule of the Council of Ministers' work for the current year. Before the start of the meeting the prime minister said that the government's main objectives for this year would be, apart from maintaining economic growth, Poland's admission to the OECD, the reform of the social security and healthcare system, the reform of central government and the state administration, and, in the second half of the year, the reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Oleksy To Be Interviewed by Sejm Commission

LD0201232796 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2300 GMT 2 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On 3 January, Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy will be interviewed by the Sejm extraordinary commission investigating the Ministry of Internal Affairs actions regarding the materials connected with the prime minister's alleged contacts with a foreign intelligence service.

A 12-strong commission, which will also supervise the course of the whole case in the prosecutor's office, has investigative powers. Its meetings are closed to the media. [passage omitted]

Former KGB Colonel Defends Oleksy

LD0201205596 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1830 GMT 2 Jan 96

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a special press conference in Moscow today, a former colonel of the KGB intelligence service, Vladimir Alganov, confirmed that he had known many Polish politicians, including Jozef Oleksy, whom he met on many occasions.

[Correspondent Wiktor Bater] Colonel Alganov firmly rejected the charges alleging that Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy was a collaborator with the Russian intelligence service. Vladimir Alganov admitted that he had known Jozef Oleksy since 1981 and that he had met him on many occasions. But, as he put it, the meetings were merely social.

[Begin Alganov recording in Russian with superimposed Polish translation] Apart from friendly contacts, I had no other contacts with Oleksy. Even if I wanted to, nobody would have let me since there was a clear ban on recruiting Polish citizens. [end recording]

[Bater] Colonel Alganov is said to have learned about a provocation against leftist politicians, under preparation by the Polish special services, during his last year's stay in Majorca. Alganov said he had met the superagent of the Polish intelligence services, Marian Zacharski, who tried to obtain information about politicians of the left from him. Vladimir Alganov decided that the whole affair was a provocation and reported his conversation with Zacharski to his former, according to him, superiors.

I did not tell Oleksy anything because that could only have made his situation worse, Alganov said. He added that the last time he saw Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy was in July 1995. Jozef Oleksy is my friend, Alganov said, and I will defend him against calumnies until I die.

Alganov also said that he had recorded his conversations with Zacharski and that he was ready to make these recordings available to the special Sejm commission.

Alganov, who is said to be involved in business, arrived at the special press conference at the INTERFAX agency building accompanied by employees of the Russian intelligence services. The black Saab limousine in which Alganov arrived also belonged to special services. [end Bator]

The State Protection Office press office refused to comment on Marian Zacharski's conversations with Alganov. It only confirmed that the office would supplement the materials sent to the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office.

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Former Foreign Intelligence Officers on Oleksy

WS0301110596 Poznan WPROST in Polish 31 Dec 95 pp 23-24

[Article by Stanislaw Janecki with Pawel Bawolec in London, Piotr Cywinski in Bonn, and Miroslaw Cielemiecki: "Friendly Contacts"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *"Let us imagine the following scenario," a British intelligence expert who asked to remain anonymous told WPROST. "At the end of 1992 or the beginning of 1993, the KGB receives orders to weaken the West's will to expand NATO and the European structures. What does Lubyanka then do? It tries to prove that Poland, the major East European state, is neither politically stable nor credible. Hence, an attempt to humiliate one of the top state officials. The KGB does not yet know who that is to be—it will depend on the situation, on who is in power. It targets a politician whose official duties include frequent meetings with 'diplomats,' among them covert residents of foreign intelligence services. A dossier is compiled to be used if diplomats fail to dissuade the West from expanding NATO.*

"The above scenario is plausible but difficult to implement. It assumes that for two or three years the dossier should fit several politicians, and only immediately before it is disclosed is it tailored to a targeted individual. Polish counterintelligence, however, could not help noticing inconsistencies of at least part of the materials and become suspicious about the credibility of the documents. Perhaps such reasoning is purely hypothetical?" the Englishman wonders.

He does not rule out the possibility that the Oleksy affair may be a splinter of the case of Aldrich Ames, the Soviet spy planted at the very heart of the CIA.

Ames could have had knowledge of the influence the KGB retained in countries of the former Eastern bloc once they broke away from Big Brother, although he might have just as well been intentionally misinformed by his Moscow employees near the end of his spying career. Either way, the CIA might have informed the Polish intelligence services that a KGB informer was operating in the midst of Polish political circles. It is difficult to say whether the informer was authentic or planted by Moscow.

In any case, the Russian intelligence spokeswoman was wrong when she said on 20 December that top politicians in the brotherly communist parties were not infiltrated. Oleg Gordiyevskiy, the former KGB agent who defected to Great Britain, told WPROST: "After the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, the KGB decided to resume the infiltration of brotherly parties. Those who did collaborate were referred to not as agents, but, euphemistically, as 'friendly contacts' or 'trusted men.' Some of them kept up their contacts with the KGB even after the changes of 1989." After August 1980, the KGB began treating Poland as it did the Western states.

Gordiyevskiy claims that the Soviet intelligence services maintained "friendly relations with first secretaries of the voivodeship [communist party] committees (two small divisions operated in each voivodeship). The number-two and number-three politicians from the particular voivodeships usually collaborated." Once the collaborator deserved the title of "friendly contact," the KGB usually qualified him as an agent and, in reports dispatched to headquarters, gave him a pseudonym. Gordiyevskiy believes "it is highly unlikely that Polish counterintelligence has not tracked down any really important agent since 1989."

Neither does the former KGB officer believe that Walesa could have devised a political intrigue of this magnitude: "Stalin could have done something like this, but not Walesa!" [passage omitted]

Poznan Daily Comments on Oleksy Affair

WS0301110696 Poznan GAZETA POZNANSKA in Polish 27 Dec 95 p 3

[Editorial by Zenon Bosacki: "Tutoring in Ethics"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After a few days of resting from politics, it is time to dabble in this little puddle of mud again because the Christmas tree is not a broom—it hasn't swept anything away.

The pathetic struggle from both sides about Oleksy (and perhaps about Milczanowski) continues. At the last moment, President Walesa promoted to the rank of general the officers who had collected information on the prime minister. Was this in order to confirm the reliability and relevance of the charges that the Military Prosecutor's Office has some doubts about "in 12 subject areas"? At the same time, it turns out that General Zacharski, who two years ago could not become head of the Office of State Protection (UOP) because of his merits for the KGB, is now irreplaceable in this new democracy.

Replaceable, however, was General Janik, another intelligence ace. One day President Walesa promotes him to the rank of general, the next day Prime Minister Oleksy recalls him from the position of deputy minister of internal affairs.

Internal Affairs is playing a game with the highest offices in the state while the top people are playing a game with the state. If it really was about a threat

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to the state, the fundamental responsibility of Minister Milczanowski was to cut short as quickly as possible Oleksy's "passing classified information of special significance," but the minister and the president waited for months to have a case against Oleksy. May he still be informing Moscow!

If it really was about the welfare of the Polish Republic that our rulers like talking about, one should have arranged the matter the way the wiser Czechs do: Having presented irrefutable evidence to the prime minister, he would be silently forced to step down for any excuse. There would not have been international shame, distaste, and suspicions. Given the endorsed solutions, it makes one doubt the reliability of the accusations.

Oleksy is playing foul and inconsistently, too. The right thing to do would have been to take his holiday leave a long time ago instead of having a deputy mninister removed, not pretend he did not have time to face the Sejm Committee, not make it harder for an unbiased investigation by his remaining in office.

In this tense situation, the new president should have, in a few words, taken a position on the matter, which, after all, is of the highest priority to the state. Perhaps this little piece of his speech got lost somewhere because the address was inconsistent. President Kwasniewski began with "Countrymen, who are with me now." Later on, it was better: "Commitments to all countrymen," meaning also to those who at the moment of the president's swearing in held a real pig's head on a stick in front of the Sejm building.

I want to believe that President Kwasniewski will keep his promises and that he will staunchly guard the dignity of the nation. At the same time, I can understand Senator Romaszewski, who explains why he did not attend the swearing-in ceremony. "It is a lie that is being sworn in."

Perhaps this is an excessive allergy. A presidentail candidate who avoids telling the truth is a small sin in comparison to what the prime minister is accused of. Yet, it is not becoming that a young president should show his arrogance: "Stop tutoring me in patriotism, please." Here is my tutoring in patriotic ethics: The president should take care of the dignity of the state not only after the elections but also before them.

Biographical Information on Chancellery Appointees

WS0301144096 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 3 Jan 96 p 2

[Report by "DOM, JOL": "President Kwasniewski's Coming Nominations; Supporters Become Officials"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Labuda, Kalisz, Lamentowicz, and Siwiec will probably be new officials at the President's Chancellery.*

Barbara Labuda, a Sejm deputy who does not belong to any parliamentary club, will be responsible for social issues in the Chancellery. Here is what [Chancellery head] Danuta Waniek told the FOLISH PRESS AGENCY yesterday: "Aleksander Kwasniewski made certain commitments to his voters. Someone must take care of that."

In 1976 Labuda began to cooperate with the Workers Defense Committee. She was an adviser in the South Silesian Solidarity. During the Martial Law regime she was in hiding. She was arrested and sentenced for a year and a half in prison. Last year she was expelled from the Freedom Union [UW] club for acting against the party's official policies. She resigned her membership in UW. In the second round of the presidential elections, she backed Kwasniewski. She is known as an active supporter of the idea of liberalizing the abortion law. She is against the Concordat.

Ryszard Kalisz, who is a lawyer, will take care of legal issues in the Chancellery. He is considered to be Kwasniewski's friend and legal adviser. He is running his own defense lawyer's office. He is the deputy chairman of the State Tribunal.

Andrzej Majkowski is to be appointed as the head of the foreign affairs office. He headed the Union of Socialist Youth in the past. Until 1992 he was the head of the Asia and Oceania Department in the Foreign Affairs Ministry; more than a year ago he was listed as the candidate of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] for a deputy minister in this ministry. He is a close partner of Polsat [private nationwide television station] owner Zygmunt Solorz and the director of his company that publishes KURIER POLSKI.

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Wojciech Lamentowicz will be Kwasniewski's adviser on foreign affairs. He is a political scientist. In the 1970's he worked at the Higher School of Social Sciences of the PZPR Central Committee. In the years 1980-81, he was a reformer, opposing the PZPR leadership. During the Martial Law regime he split with the party and began publishing his writings in the underground press. Until recently he was the deputy chairman of the Union of Labor [UP]; he headed the campaign staff of Tadeusz Zielinski. In the second round of the elections, against the UP official stand, he endorsed Kwasniewski, for which he was expelled from the presidium of the party and suspended as an UP member.

Marek Siwiec is to be the head of the office of presidential political services. He is a physicist; he was a member of the PZPR and then a member of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic. In 1983 he became the chief editor of STUDENT, a Krakow publication; then he took over ITD, replacing Kwasniewski. In 1990 he was the chief editor of TRYBUNA. A year later he was appointed as SLD press spokesman. Today he is an SLD deputy and a member of the National Council of Radio and Television.

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Iliescu on Russian Elections, EU Expansion

AU0201194996 Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 23 Dec 95 pp 3-4

[Interview with President Ion Iliescu by unidentified Radio XXI correspondent; place and date not given: "I Believe That Romania's Chance Lies Not in Looking Back, But in Looking Forward and in Seeking Appropriate Solutions for the Turn of the Century"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent] Mr. President Ion Iliescu, with 1995 coming to an end, the time has come for some balance sheets. I will not ask you to draw up a balance sheet of 1995, since we do not have the time or place for it, but I would like you to pick two political moments that you consider to be the most significant of this year.

[Iliescu] I think that we can draw two weighty balance sheets at the end of this year. The first is the sixth anniversary of the Romanian revolution, with 1995 marking several significant moments in this respect, including the political and—in my opinion—the major moment of the consensus eventually reached by all political forces represented in Parliament in working out the national strategy for Romania's future socioeconomic development and integration into the EU. [passage omitted] There was also a second moment of convergence, namely, that of the Romanian initiative for a historic reconciliation with Hungary, when I met with the heads of all political parties, who unanimously backed this Romanian initiative. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Mr. President, I would like you to list some of your regrets for 1995, if such moments existed.

[Iliescu] There were several such moments. [passage omitted] One of these regrets is linked to the persistence of a tense climate in our political life, which causes us great unhappiness. I would say it is due to a lack of maturity in our development. Although we have made great progress compared to previous years, there is still some strain in our political debates and confrontation, which is harmful to everybody concerned. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] 1996 will be an electoral year. What will be, in your opinion, the political and economic impact of the electoral results in Russia, and when we will be able to join the EU?

[Iliescu] Everybody is concerned about the elections in Russia. Why? Because Russia is a large country, a great power, both militarily and economically, and also one of the countries with the largest resources in the world. Therefore, the consolidation of Russia's internal stability is an issue of concern for the stability of all of Europe and beyond. That is why the electoral results there are viewed from this angle, namely, the extent to which they will influence the stabilization of the democratic processes and the consolidation of the rule-of-law structures and of democratic society in Russia and the impact they will have on Russia's development as a modern economic country with a viable and efficient market economy. Everybody is interested in Russia becoming a viable partner for Europe and the whole world, in view of the fact that it is a market with a great absorption potential and a much coveted partner. As far as we are concerned, we are interested in both aspects. To this, one should also add our past history and the desire to have neighbors that can be our partners and of which we have nothing to be afraid. At the same time, seen from another constructive angle, a stable Russia that is developing in normal conditions can become a very important partner for all of Europe and for its neighboring countries, such as Romania.

Regarding our integration into Europe, there were two major topics in Madrid...

[Correspondent] Mr. President, I would like you to comment a bit on this tendency of the hardline group, so to say, within the EU, which wants to first promote the adherence of the countries from the so-called Visegrad group.

[Iliescu] This was one of the two major topics discussed in Madrid. [passage omitted] During the debates, we stated openly our bewilderment and that of the Romanian people about the campaign of certain political forces and about certain political statements and press campaigns aimed at instituting a discriminatory approach to EU adherence, by introducing all sorts of classification tables for the associate countries. It is premature, unproductive, and damaging to discuss this matter at this time. There are far more serious problems to be discussed right now. The association process is in its incipient phase. The association presupposes an intensive dialogue with the EU. We have taken serious steps to prepare our strategy, which stipulates a constant dialogue between the governmental bodies. We have already started these discussions. We have even set up a special department for European integration. [passage omitted] All this presupposes a steady dialogue, lasting quite a few years; which means that we will have enough to do until the year 2000.

The discussion on EU integration should create a climate of cohesion among the associate countries, not of discord and competition. [passage omitted] The important thing is to preserve a climate of cooperation, good-neighborliness, and mutual trust, not of opposition and opposing interests.

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[Correspondent] Mr. President, in conclusion, I would like you to present some of your thoughts and plans for 1996.

[Iliescu] First of all, I would like to thank you for this opportunity to greet all your listeners and wish them a happy new year. Let us bow our heads to all those who gave their lives for the Romanian revolution, because this is also a time for commemoration and an anniversary of a crucial moment in Romania's history. I hope that 1996 will be a better year for everybody, in promoting the ideals of the revolution and consolidating the country's economic development.

Poll Shows 94 Percent Favor Joining NATO

AU0301091896 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 28 Dec 95 p 3

[Unattributed Report: "According to an IRSOP Poll, the Majority of the Romanians Believe That Ion Iliescu and the PDSR Will Win the Elections Again in 1996"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the request of Romanian national television, the Romanian Public Opinion Polling Institute (IRSOP) conducted a public opinion poll from 14 to 19 December 1995 on the issue "What Do Romanians Believe About Their Life in 1996?"

For you, personally, was 1995 a good year?	
Good	22%
Medium	55%
Bad	23%

How do you think 1996 will be for you, personally?	
Better	28%
Worse	14%
Same	34%
Do not know	24%

Do you believe that in 1996...		
	Yes	No
...you will spend your leisure time farming?	65%	35%
...heating and hot water will be available?	61%	39%
...each month you will be able to make ends meet?	56%	44%
...you will organize a party on your birthday?	53%	47%
...you will find inner peace?	50%	50%
...you will make improvements to your living quarters?	34%	66%
...you or someone else in your family might become unemployed?	30%	70%
...you will buy something that today costs over 1 million lei?	27%	73%
...you will participate in some sport?	25%	75%
...you will deposit your money in a bank or your savings account?	23%	77%
...you will switch jobs?	14%	86%
...you will travel abroad?	11%	89%
...you will open a private business?	11%	89%
...you will move into a new apartment?	9%	91%

Do you believe that in the 1996 elections the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] will...	
Win again	57%
Lose	27%
Do not know	16%

In 1996 would you like...		
	Yes	No
...Romania to join NATO?	94%	6%

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In 1996 would you like...	Yes	No
...Romania to more closely approach West Europe?	94%	6%
...to achieve historical reconciliation between Romania and Hungary?	92%	8%
...foreign investors to come?	75%	25%
...Romania to become a communist country?	9%	91%

Do you believe that, if Ion Iliescu runs for the presidency in 1996, he will...	
Win	67%
Lose	20%
Do not know	13%

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Clinton, Kucan Lead in 1995 Popularity Poll

AU0101204896

[FBIS Editorial Report] Ljubljana DELO in Slovene in its 21 December edition on pages 1 and 4 carries a report by Slava Partjic on the results of a traditional annual opinion poll on the most prominent domestic and international politicians and personalities in 1995.

According to the report, the poll was conducted among 1120 computer-selected telephone subscribers throughout Slovenia on 13 December. Great effort was taken to make the sample represent as closely as possible the actual structure of the Slovene population.

For the fifth time in a row, Slovene President Milan Kucan was convincingly voted the Slovene personality of the year. He won 26.4 percent of all votes. He is followed by skier Jure Kosir, Janez Jansa, president of the Social Democratic Party, and Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek. The remaining 31 candidates comprise various Slovene artists, politicians, and other public figures.

Kucan also won in the category of Slovene politician of 1995. The list is as follows:

Popularity of Slovene Politicians

	Votes	Percent
Milan Kucan	413	36.9
Janez Jansa	115	10.3
Janez Drnovsek	102	9.1
Marjan Podobnik	48	4.3
Zoran Thaler	38	3.4
Lojze Peterle	17	1.5
Zmago Jelincic	15	1.3
Janez Podobnik	8	0.7
Jelko Kacin	4	0.4
Tone Partljic	4	0.4
Ivo Hvalica	3	0.3
Marja Konih Novak	3	0.3
Andrej Ster	2	0.2
Ivo Bizjak	2	0.2
Tone Persak	2	0.2

The report contains diagrams comparing the results of the same poll for the previous two years. The diagrams show that compared with 1994 Kucan increased his popularity as the Slovene personality of the year (he won 25 percent in 1994) and the Slovene politician of the year (27.5 percent in 1994). Actually, the diagrams imply that he was the one who managed to improve his rating, however, he did not quite match his 1993 performance (33.5 percent of the votes as the Slovene personality of the year and 46.9 percent as the Slovene politician of the year).

The second on the list, Janez Jansa, on the other hand suffered a considerable decline in votes. His popularity as the Slovene personality nearly halved (11.9 percent of votes in 1994) and also declined steadily in the category of the Slovene politician of the year (14.8 percent in 1994, 16 percent in 1993).

Janez Drnovsek lost a few points as the Slovene personality of the year (5.7 percent in 1994); however, he maintained his percentage as the Slovene politician of the year (9.1 percent in 1994).

Marjan Podobnik, president of the Peoples' Party, held on steadily as the fourth most popular Slovene politician (4.3 percent in 1994, 4.1 in 1993); however, he lost some votes as the personality of the year (2.3 percent).

The poll also searched for the international politician of 1995. The list of winners is as follows:

Popularity of Foreign Politicians

	Votes	Percent
Bill Clinton	636	56.8
Helmut Kohl	44	3.9
Yitzaq Rabin	35	3.4
Slobodan Milosevic	14	1.3
Nelson Mandela	13	1.2
Haris Silajdzic	13	1.2
Jacques Chirac	10	0.9
Richard Holbrooke	8	0.7
Alija Izetbegovic	7	0.6
Warren Christopher	5	0.4
Butrus Butrus-Ghali	4	0.4
Milan Kucan	4	0.4
George Bush	3	0.3

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	Votes	Percent
Janez Drnovsek	3	0.3
Franjo Tudjman	3	0.3
Muhamed Sacirbegovic	2	0.2
Dalai Lama	2	0.2
Boris Yeltsin	2	0.2
Francois Mitterand	2	0.2
Pope John Paul II	2	0.2

The report also carries results in the category of the international personality of 1995. In this category, too, Clinton came convincingly first, winning 47 percent of all votes. Among those that made it on the list are also George Bush, Hillary Clinton, and Ronald Reagan as well as Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, who came ninth and won more votes than any Slovene politician or any other president of the countries that were former Yugoslav republics.

Parliament Passes Guarantees for Loan Repayment

AU0201202196 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 28 Dec 95 p 2

[Report by Marko Jakopec: "Slovenia Will Guarantee Loans of the U.S. Export-Import Bank"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ljubljana, 27 December—After a whole day of debate, the State Chamber today finally passed a law on guarantees of the Republic of Slovenia for debts contained in the agreement on the assumption of debts by Slovene debtors originating from the refinanced credits of the U.S. Export-Import Bank. A law regulating the repayment of obligations from the bilateral agreements on the assumption of the Slovene debts originating from the agreements on consolidation of credits by the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and the Paris Club countries in the period from 1984 to 1988 also gained support.

In the continuation of the extraordinary session, the chamber debated the proposal of the law on the guarantees of the Republic of Slovenia for the debts contained in the agreement on assumption of debts by the Slovene debtors originating from the refinanced loans by the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank). The law, which the parliament passed in the summary procedure, will weigh down the state treasury by $81 million, which is how much the overdue and due capital and interest for repayment of unpaid credits to Sava Power Plants, Steam Power Plant Trbovlje, Adria Airways, Radio and Television Slovenia, the Slovene Railroads, Novogoriska Banka, Gorenjska Banka, and Nova Ljubljanska Banka will amount to. The debate on the law actually started a couple of days ago. Out of dissatisfaction with the proposed text of the law and its explanation, the Slovene Peoples' Party [SLS] announced that it did not intend to participate in passage of the law. The clubs of deputies of the Social Democratic Party, the Slovene National Right, and the SPS [expansion unknown] joined it in the obstruction. [passage omitted]

Expansion of MORiS Special Brigade Announced

AU2812215695 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 16 Dec 95 p 2

[Report by Blaz Zgaga: "Fifth Anniversary of MORiS Special Brigade"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Primoze, 15 December—At the morning ceremony marking the fifth anniversary of the formation and first presentation of the 1st Special Brigade of the Ministry of Defense [MORiS], Defense Minister Jelko Kacin said that, in the circumstances of that time, the existence of this brigade was crucial for securing realistic military and security muscle for our independence process. "The alignment of this brigade's members, arms, and equipment had an enormous impact on Slovene confidence. At the same time, it signaled that we meant serious business."

The MORiS commander, Brigadier Vojko Pavlin said that the brigade had justified its existence, the merit for which goes to the many present and former members. Prior to the ceremony, members of the brigade demonstrated arms handling, and a part of the unit for international cooperation demonstrated their skills in peace operations. They demonstrated the procedure employed in the event of an incident at a checkpoint. The dog-handling unit carried out demonstration drills, while the anti-terrorist and reconnaissance unit of the rapid intervention squad demonstrated the capture of a group of saboteurs. Members of MORiS also demonstrated their skills in martial arts, a descent from a tower, and archery. Parachute jumps were canceled due to poor weather.

The permanent corps of the MORiS brigade consists of approximately 150 professionals and its reserve corps numbers 3,000. Minister Kacin announced the expansion of the permanent corps and said that an important aim of the Slovene Army was also to realize the fundamental development programs of military armament. "We will have to modernize the defense forces' existing systems and, for that reason, the defense budget cannot be cut." As he also said, studies of comparable countries show "that we do not invest

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much in the defense system." At the end, the minister bestowed medals and decorations to the meritorious members of the MORiS special brigade.

World Federation of Hungarians Sets Up Council

LD0201132296 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 2 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The World Federation of Hungarians has set up a National Council in Slovenia. In the beginning the body will operate in the framework of the Self-Governing National Community of Hungarians in Prekmurje. Every ethnic Hungarian-populated locality of the area will be proportionally represented. The new National Council in Slovenia will strengthen the trend of decentralization within the World Federation of Hungarians.

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Serbia

Opposition To Field Joint Candidates

AU0301105796 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 27 Dec 95 pp 1-2

[Article by V.D., N.K., J.S.: "Next Step—Shadow Cabinet"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—The first session of the "parallel parliament" of Serbia, which started with a scandal (at first the assembly building security guards would not allow the opposition delegates to enter the conference room), announced a step that until recently would have been unbelievable, namely the fielding of joint opposition candidates in the next elections.

In the words of its first chairman, Aleksandar Vucic (Serbian Radical Party), the constituent session of the "alternative assembly" was attended by 108 delegates from five clubs (Democratic Movement of Serbia [DEPOS], Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO], Serbian Radical Party [SRS], Democratic Party [DS], Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS]). They announced continuous sessions, until the direct television broadcasts [of assembly sessions] are resumed, or a multi-party managing board of the Radio-Television of Serbia formed. The newly formed assembly will have its rules and will deal with passing laws that are in accordance with the programs of all parliamentary opposition parties. All draft laws will be forwarded to the official parliament, the work of which the opposition will still be able to influence through its work in assembly committees.

In the words of SPO leader Vuk Draskovic, the "parallel parliament" should result in a shadow cabinet and a joint candidature for elections under the slogan "one list—the defeat of the communists." Other speakers at yesterday's conference also spoke in favor of the unified opposition block, referring to the results of previous elections in which opposition parties together won 2 million votes, whereas the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] won half a million votes less. "Some sessions of this parliament will not take place in this room but in front of the parliament building. If there is no direct television broadcast then, in some cases, there will be direct broadcasts for the people. The delegates will be in front of the assembly, and the people will come and suggest amendments," Vuk Draskovic said.

The leader of the SRS group of delegates, Tomislav Nikolic, announced that the new relationships in the opposition will be built up patiently. "If some believe that they can win against the socialists alone, then let them try. I believe that that is not the way, and in this assembly I will try to convince you that we have to cooperate against those who want to destroy Serbia," Nikolic said, and added that "the alternative parliament should formulate the objectives of Serb national policy."

Evaluating that "politics as an expression of the sovereignty of citizens has been destroyed in Serbia," DS President Zoran Djindjic promised that the DS will guarantee with its name for joint work on the return of politics [sentence as published].

"From now on the DS no longer has any authorship rights on the projects for the reform of state management, social and pension insurance and the education system. Let those problems be common problems of democratic Serbia," Djindjic said.

Stressing that he was expressing his personal view, DSS President Vladislav Kostunica said that the opposition must expedite the start of the elections. "It is little if we say that every day with the present regime is a day lost. Just as the Constitution of Bosnia was discussed in some small American town, the Constitution of Serbia will also be discussed somewhere else in the future," Kostunica said, and added that there were several ways to expedite elections, and the best was to return the delegates' mandates.

Andras Agoston, (DZVM) [Democratic Union of Vojvodina Hungarians], concluded that the agreement of the opposition parties represented "the real beginning of the big race to Europe," and that "in that race we should have the best horses." Beljulj Nasufi, delegate of the Party for Democratic Action [SDD] from Presevo, who, as he claims, spoke at an assembly for the first time in four years, said that, given the example of the two municipalities the Albanian representatives of which "joined the system," the regime in Serbia had shown that it was not capable of solving the Kosovo issue.

There were no verbal duels or replies at the first session of the "parallel parliament," unless the speech of Vesna Pesic, president of the Citizen Union of Serbia, is seen as such; it got the strongest applause from the delegates. Whereas nearly all the speakers who spoke before her had mentioned communists and their regime as the main cause for the absence of democracy, at the beginning of her speech Vesna Pesic said that that was a lie, and that the cause was "the hardest thing—money."

"It is not ideology that is the problem. It is normal for ideologies to exist. The problem is that ever since the public loan for the recovery of Serbia we have been living in a robber society, and that has become a family affair. What I want to say is that we do not have a state but a strong family at the top; and personal power, that is known, does not accept any institutions. We have no right to fool our citizens, and in this parliament our task is to show the facts, although the worst thing is to fight a criminal state," Vesna Pesic concluded.

Party leaders are to agree on the next session of the "alternative parliament."

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